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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 36 MARCH 1983 NUMBER 2
Tying Arrangements and Class
Actions
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Class action tying arrangement suits present courts with difficult is-
sues because the "common question" requirement for class certification
complicates the already complex economic analysis that courts must use
to establish the tying arrangement's harm. In his Article Professor
Hovenkamp argues that class certification should depend on the eco-
nomic function of the tying arrangement in the defendant's distribution
scheme. Most tie-ins, he notes, benefit some groups of potential plaintiffs
and harm other groups, and these groups vary depending on the function
of the tying arrangement. Professor Hovenkamp evaluates the various
purposes and effects of tying arrangements and analyzes the propriety of
certifying a tying arrangement class action in each situation. He con-
cludes that tie-ins in which the court cannot determine easily which
plaintiffs have suffered injury are not suitable for class action proceed-
ings. Professor Hovenkamp proposes that in these situations use of non-
mutual, offensive collateral estoppel may be a viable alternative.
I. INTRODUCTION
Few areas of federal antitrust law are more confusing than the
law that governs tying arrangements. Plaintiffs compound the confu-
sion by bringing tying arrangement cases as class actions because the
"common question" requirement for class certification vastly compli-
cates the economic analysis of the potential harms of tying arrange-
ments. In their recent attempts to unravel some of this confusion,
scholars have failed to focus on either the economic justifications for
tying arrangements or the precise nature of the arrangements' poten-
* Associate Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. B.A., 1969, Calvin College;
M.A., 1971, Ph.D., 1976, J.D., 1978, University of Texas.
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tial for economic harm.' This Article begins with the premise that
one cannot understand the class action tying arrangement case with-
out understanding the tying arrangement-its functions, potential
economic benefits, and potential harms. Indeed, these considerations
should be crucial to a court's decision whether to certify a tying ar-
rangement class action.
A. Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement is a condition that a seller imposes upon a
buyer which allows the buyer to purchase one product only if the
buyer also takes a second product.' The first product, presumably the
one that the purchaser really wants, is the "tying product." The sec-
ond product, which the buyer may not want, is the "tied product."
The creator of the tying arrangement may lease rather than sell one
or both of the products.'
Sellers create tying arrangements for several reasons, and corre-
spondingly, tying arrangements have a number of social and eco-
nomic effects. Among the purposes and effects that courts, commen-
tators, and litigants have attributed to tying arrangements are the
following: (1) They permit the holder of a monopoly to create an ad-
ditional monopoly in a second ("tied") product and thereby increase
monopoly profits;4 (2) they permit sellers in price-regulated markets
to avoid or conceal avoidance of price regulation;5 (3) they permit
certain sellers to engage in or conceal predatory pricing;6 (4) they
permit certain kinds of sellers to engage in or conceal price discrimi-
1. See Austin, The Individual Coercion Doctrine in Tie-In Analysis: Confusing and Ir-
relevant, 65 CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1977); Matheson, Class Action Tying Cases: A Framework for
Certification Decisions, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 855 (1982); Note, Tying the Hands of Franchisees -
The Individual Coercion Doctrine in Antitrust Class Actions, 9 CONN. L. REV. 164 (1976);
Note, Tying Arrangements-Class Actions-Each Franchisee Must Prove Individual Coer-
cion, 55 TEX. L. REv. 343 (1977); Note, Tying Arrangements and the Individual Coercion Doc-
trine, 30 VAND. L. REv. 755 (1977).
2. Federal antitrust law condemns tying arrangements in § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1976), and in § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Although the statutes
may impose slightly different substantive tests and have slightly different subject matter and
jurisdictional limits, these distinctions are of no concern in this Article. See Hovenkamp, Tying
Arrangements in the Real Estate Market: Federal Antitrust Law and Local Land Develop-
ment Policy, 33 HASTnNGS L.J. 325 (1981).
3. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
4. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 21
(1957); infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
5. See Bowman, supra note 4, at 21-23; Markovits, Tie-ins and Reciprocity: A Func-
tional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58 Txx. L. REv. 1363, 1383-85 (1980); infra notes 64-71 and
accompanying text.
6. See Markovits, supra note 5; infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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nation, or alternatively, they permit certain sellers to meter costs in
situations in which sellers' costs vary with use;7 (5) they may increase
efficiency by improving the quality or distribution of a seller's prod-
uct.' Sellers may create tying arrangements for one or more of these
reasons.
9
In the strictest physical sense, virtually all sales are "tying ar-
rangements." For example, a customer cannot walk into a grocery
store and purchase corn flakes without also taking and paying for the
box. A buyer cannot purchase half a jar of peanut butter without tak-
ing the other half or buy a can of vegetable soup without taking the
turnips. As these illustrations suggest, the vast majority of sales are
"tying arrangements" in the purest sense because these sales are so
extraordinarily efficiency creating. The grocery business would come
to a standstill if the law entitled every purchaser to atomize his
purchases as he chose. When Congress passed the Clayton Act it did
not intend to permit purchasers to remove and decline to pay for the
turnips in the vegetable soup or to spoon out one-half of the jar of
peanut butter and pay only for the remainder.
Nevertheless, Congress predicated the law against tying arrange-
ments on the assumption that not all mandatory combined sales are
efficiency creating. While some tying arrangements are socially bene-
ficial, others are socially harmful. Still others may be characterized as
beneficial or harmful depending upon the viewer's own economic and
social values. An effective antitrust policy ought to approve the first
category of tying arrangements, condemn the second category, and
scrutinize the third category. In other words, the purpose of the law
of tying arrangements should be to distinguish efficiency-creating
from efficiency-destroying tying arrangements. 10
This Article does not attempt to identify socially harmful tying
arrangements." Rather, it draws upon the vast literature and case
7. See Bowman, supra note 4, at 20-21; Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Lever-
age Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397, 1443-59 (1967); infra notes 77-122 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 123-49 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
127 (1982); infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
10. See R. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR wrrH ITSELF 365-81 (1978).
11. For some attempts to do this, see id.; L. SuL.uvAN, ANTRUST §§ 151-162 (1977);
Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33
VAND. L. Rzv. 283 (1980); Bowman, supra note 4; Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reci-
procity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 552 (1965); Freed, Reconsidering
the Per Se Approach to Tying Agreements, 13 U. TOL. L. REv. 571 (1982); Markovits, supra
note 5; Markovits, supra note 7; Markovits, Part II: Tie-Ins, Leverages, and the American
Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Markovits, Part II]; Posner, Ex-
clusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 506 (1974); Slawson, A
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law of tying arrangements to suggest possible solutions to a perplex-
ing problem in the law of antitrust class actions: under what circum-
stances do common questions predominate over individual questions
in tying arrangement cases and thereby justify class action treat-
ment? Courts today agree generally that although the amount of
damages may vary considerably from one prospective class member
to another, 12 certification of a class action requires that the fact of
injury be demonstrable by proof common to all members of a class. 13
As this Article shows, some tying arrangements injure all customers
or competitors of the seller in the same way and are socially injuri-
ous. Cases concerning tie-ins of this kind usually are suitable for class
action treatment. Other tie-ins, however, injure one set of customers
while they benefit another set. These kinds of tying arrangements
may or may not be socially injurious.14 They are not suitable for class
action treatment unless the customers injured by the arrangement
are somehow distinguishable from the customers that the tie-in
benefits.
B. The Requirements of Rule 23
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions in the
federal courts.1 5 Rule 23(b)(3) specifically addresses class actions for
damages that carry little risk of adversely affecting either the defen-
dant or other plaintiffs if individual class members brought them as
separate actions."6 Since plaintiffs in class action tying arrangement
Stronger, Simpler Tie-in Doctrine, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 671 (1980); Turner, The Validity of
Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. Rav. 50 (1958).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 20-21.
13. Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1978); Bogosian v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Windham v.
American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 69-70 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968
(1978); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., 86 F.R.D. 145, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1980); see Kypta v. McDon-
ald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 127 (1982).
14. Whether tie-ins of this kind are socially injurious is a fundamental question of liabil-
ity and is not a central concern of this Article.
15. See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
16. Rule 23(b)(3) states:
Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the pre-
requisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
[Vol. 36:213
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cases seek predominantly damages, they bring virtually all these ac-
tions under rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) not only requires that certain
questions be common to all members of the class, but also that these
common questions "predominate" over individual questions. The rule
does not define predominate, and no generalized theory of common
question predominance has developed in the case law. Courts, how-
ever, have articulated a number of criteria.17 For example, certifica-
tion of a rule 23(b)(3) class requires a showing that the simultaneous
litigation of certain issues with respect to all class members will save
substantial judicial time."8 Under this standard, even if some issues
require separate resolution for each class member, the court, never-
theless, will approve certification if a "common nucleus of operative
facts"1 9 exists that the court can determine most efficiently in a sin-
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 96, 102-103.
Rule 23(b)(1) permits a class action when separate actions might adversely affect class
members or the opposing party. Although rule 23(b)(1) might apply in some antitrust cases,
plaintiffs rarely have used it. A few situations, however, have arisen in which the common inter-
est of a group of antitrust plaintiffs was strong enough that a court was willing to certify a class
under rule 23(b)(1). For example, in Robertson v. National Basketball Aas'n, 389 F. Supp. 867,
901 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1977), plaintiffs were all members of the
same association of athletic teams, and a proposed league merger affected all team members.
The advantages of using rule 23(b)(1) are several. First, unlike rule 23(b)(3), it does not require
individual notice to class members. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
Second, while rule 23(b)(3) gives class members the option of excluding themselves from the
class, rule 23(b)(1) does not. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Last, while rule 23(b)(3) explicitly
requires that those parties seeking certification show that "a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy," rule 23(b)(1) as-
sesses no such requirement. The case law has muted these differences considerably. See 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1777-1779, 1786-1788 (1972). One
instance in which rule 23(b)(1)(A) might have been applicable in tie-in litigation was Sandles v.
Ruben, 89 F.R.D. 635 (S.D. Fla. 1981). The plaintiff class seeking certification in Sandles com-
prised owners of condominium units in a single condominium complex. They alleged that a
mandatory 99-year recreational lease in part of the common areas of the condominium complex
was an illegal tying arrangement. Each member of the class owned an exclusive interest in his
individual condominium unit and an undivided interest in the common areas, which members
of the proposed class shared. Thus, a declaration by the court in an action brought by any
individual condominium unit owner that the 99-year lease in the common areas was invalid
could adversely affect the rights of all other owners in the condominium complex. See Bennett
v. Behring Corp., 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 1222 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1982). A
common interest in real property, however, does not guarantee that the court will certify a class
of people who have the interest. See Potrero Hill Community Action Comm. v. Housing Auth.,
410 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1969).
17. For a general discussion of these criteria and the issues surrounding them, see 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, & 1778.
18. See id. § 1779.
19. See id. § 1778, at 53; Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
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gle proceeding. Just because the amount of damages suffered by each
class member varies, a court will not deny certification as long as
common proof for the class as a whole can establish violation of the
statute, causation, and fact of injury.20
A price-fixing conspiracy that injures all direct purchasers in a
cartelized market is a paradigm example of an antitrust action suita-
ble for rule 23(b)(3) treatment.1 Although each member of the class
may have purchased a different amount of the cartelized product
and, therefore, claims a different amount of damages, the existence of
the cartel and the injury it caused nevertheless present questions
common to all direct purchasers. These questions "predominate" for
rule 23(b)(3) purposes.22 If proof of a liability question will vary from
one putative class member to another, however, then the court either
should not certify the class or it should identify a smaller, more ho-
mogeneous class. 23 In general, the courts adamantly require that the
fact of injury be susceptible to common proof for all members of the
class.24
II. CLASS ACTIONS AND THE LOGIC OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS
Tying arrangements occasionally affect all purchasers in the
same way and present questions suitable for class action considera-
tion. More frequently, however, the tying arrangement has the eco-
nomic effect of dividing its "victims" into groups. The tie-in disad-
vantages some groups more than others; some suffer no injury at all,
and a few actually benefit from the alleged tying arrangement. In
these cases class action certification is unsuitable unless the court can
limit the putative class to a group of persons upon whom the tying
arrangement has a similar and adverse impact.
To decide whether a tying arrangement case is suitable for class
action certification, a court first must establish the economic function
that the tying arrangement serves in the defendant's distribution
scheme. Only through this determination can a court ascertain
394 U.S. 928 (1969).
20. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 1778, at 54-55 nn. 29 & 30.
21. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); National Constructors Ass'n v.
National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1980); In re Plywood Anti-Trust
Litig., 76 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. La. 1976); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, 301 F. Supp. 484
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
22. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 1781, at 79-80.
23. See, e.g., Kendler v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Boro
Hall v. Metropolitan Tobacco Co., 74 F.R.D. 142 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); McCoy v. Convenient Food
Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
24. See supra cases cited note 13.
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whether the legal issues in a case are predominately common to all
class members or whether they are individual and thus necessitate
separate actions.
To determine the legality of tying arrangements, courts have de-
veloped a verbally simple test that belies the complexity and incon-
sistency of the underlying case law. Although many courts identify
three elements of an illegal tying arrangement, those courts actually
have combined two or more distinct legal questions into a single ele-
ment. 5 In the interest of clarity, therefore, this Article uses the five
element test that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit articulated in 1980, as follows: (1) There must be separate
tying and tied products; (2) there must be "evidence of actual coer-
cion by the seller that in fact forced the buyer to accept the tied
product. . .;" (3) the seller must possess "sufficient economic power
in the tying product market to coerce purchaser acceptance of the
tied product . . .;" (4) there must be "anticompetitive effects in the
tied market ... ;" and (5) there must be "involvement of a 'not in-
substantial' amount of interstate commerce in the tied product mar-
ket ... ."28
The courts first developed this legal test for tying arrangements
before economic efficiency emerged as a major concern of the anti-
trust laws. The test, therefore, largely ignores the elements of eco-
nomic efficiency and the tying arrangements' economic impact on
purchasers. A judicial test that attempted to distinguish between effi-
ciency-creating and efficiency-destroying tying arrangements proba-
bly would differ substantially from the standard that the courts now
use. The current test, however, appears to have the imprimatur of
the United States Supreme Court2 7 and likely will remain in use. Cre-
25. For an example of a three part test, see Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), in which the court stated:
First ... the scheme in question involves two distinct items and provides that one (the
tying product) may not be obtained unless the other (the tied product) is also pur-
chased.... Second ... the tying product possesses sufficient economic power apprecia-
bly to restrain competition in the tied product market. . . .Third, .. a "not insubstan-
tial" amount of commerce is affected by the arrangement.
448 F.2d at 47 (emphasis by the court) (citations omitted). This test merges the requirements
of market power in the tying product and the existence of injury. See infra note 43.
26. Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). For a
slightly different five part test, see Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108, 117-
18 (C.D. Cal. 1978). The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to adopt the suggested test. Krehl v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1352 n.8 (9th Cir. 1982). For a four element test
that is now the law of the Fifth Circuit, see Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hoasp. Dist. No. 2, 686
F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (Mar. 7, 1983 U.S.); Bob Max-
field, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981).
27. The Supreme Court has not adopted the generally accepted three part tie-in test that
2191983]
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ative courts have read economic efficiency into certain elements of
the test; for example, they occasionally have used economic efficiency
as a criterion to determine whether the "package" that the defendant
sold consisted of separate products or a single product. These courts
have reasoned that if a seller can manufacture or distribute items
most efficiently in a certain package, then the evidence is strong that
the particular package is a single product.28 Indeed, by ignoring the
element of economic efficiency, the current test fails to address the
possibility that a particular tying arrangement should be legal be-
cause it is efficiency creating.
Two elements of the Second Circuit's test create no barrier to
class action certification of tying arrangement cases. The courts uni-
formly consider the issue whether the tying arrangement consists of
separate tying and tied products to be common to all members of the
class.29 Similarly, the issue whether the tying arrangement affects a
"not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied product market
is common to all class members because the court determines the
substantiality requirement using the defendant's total sales, not its
sales to any particular plaintiff.30
appears in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
955 (1972). See supra note 25. In Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953), however, the Supreme Court required that the tie-in consist of separate tying and tied
products. Id. at 613-14. Writing for the majority, Justice Clark also stated that in tying actions
brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must show both sufficient market power in
the tying product to restrain competition in the tied product and restraint of a substantial
volume of commerce in the tied product. Id. at 608-09. Justice Clark, however, added that if a
plaintiff brings the action under § 3 of the Clayton Act, only one of these two conditions must
be shown. Id. The circuits generally have ignored Justice Clark's distinction and have opted for
a unitary test that imposes all three requirements. See Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir. 1980); Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 1978); Moore v. Jas.
H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1977).
28. For express acknowledgement of the relationship between efficiency and the "separate
product" requirement, see Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1347-48 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348,
1352-53 (9th Cir. 1982); Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 309-11 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Anderson Foreign Motors v. New England Toyota Distribs.,
475 F. Supp. 973, 982 (D. Mass. 1979); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228,
233-34 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (Memorex); Meenan Oil Co. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 39 A.D.2d
233, 238, 333 N.Y.S.2d 657, 661 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The "separate products" requirement is actu-
ally an indirect way for a court to determine the legality of a particular tying arrangement
based on its efficiency.
29. Courts that have examined roughly identical sets of facts, however, have decided the
separate products issue differently. Compare Martino v. McDonald's Sys., 81 F.R.D. 81, 87-88
(N.D. IMI. 1979) (franchise rights and lease in store are separate products) with Principe v.
McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 309-10 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981)
(franchise rights and lease in store are a single product).
30. See Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1969).
220
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Courts in tying arrangement class action cases have used the
three remaining elements of the Second Circuit test to defeat the rule
23(b)(3) requirement that common questions predominate over indi-
vidual questions. Federal courts have found certification improper on
the ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove that they as a class were
forced to purchase the tied product.-1 Courts also have held that one
must analyze the seller's market power in the tying product individu-
ally for different purchaser-plaintiffs in different geographical areas.
32
Finally, some courts have held that the existence of "anticompetitive
effects" can vary depending upon the plaintiff and, thus, the issue
requires individual analysis and a denial of class certification. 3 The
last of these three elements is the most problematic. A determination
whether the tying arrangement actually required each class member
to take the tied product along with the tying product usually reduces
to the rather simple conceptual problem but difficult factual problem
of deciding if some members of the class could have acquired the ty-
ing product without the tied product and, hence, took the tied prod-
uct of their own free will. Courts have devised some simplifying
schemes for answering this question. For example, circuits hold uni-
formly that if all members of a putative class can produce a written
contractual provision requiring them to take the tied product, then
the court will assume that the seller actually forced the arrangement
upon them. Class certification then will be prima facie appropriate on
this issue. 4 If, however, the court must examine a course of dealing
between the defendant and each individual plaintiff to establish coer-
cion, or if the evidence shows that the parties negotiated each sales
package individually with terms that varied from one purchaser to
another, then the issue is likely to be an individual question, and
class certification is inappropriate. 5
31. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1226 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 823 (1976); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Coleman Oil Co., 470 F.2d 925, 930 n.5 (lst Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); Schuler v. Better Equip. Launder Center, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 85,
87 (D. Mass. 1977); Hehir v. Shell Oil Co., 72 F.R.D. 18, 21-22 (D. Mass. 1976); see Matheson,
supra note 1, at 875-80.
32. See Cash v. Arctic Circle, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,095 (E.D. Wash. Dec.
14, 1979); Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,089 (E.D.N.Y.) Dec. 14,
1979); infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
33. See Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 127 (1982); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978); Windham v.
American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 65-66 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978);
infra note 44 and accompanying text.
34. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 450 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., 81 F.R.D. 81, 87 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
35. See cases cited supra note 31.
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The question whether the defendant has market power in the
tying product has played a smaller role in tying arrangement class
action certification decisions. Nonetheless, courts have used it occa-
sionally to defeat certification of a proferred class.3 6 A seller's market
power is limited to certain geographic areas. As in the law of monop-
olies or mergers, therefore, the plaintiffs in tying arrangement cases
must show that the defendant has a certain amount of power in some
relevant market. When the plaintiffs are the defendant's customers,
the court must limit class certification to class members that operate
in that particular market.3 7 When the plaintiffs are competitors of
the defendant, their location is not as important because the courts
measure a seller's market power vis-A-vis the purchasers of the tied
package, not the seller's competitors.38
The economic issue of market power in tying cases is approacha-
ble from the perspective of either the defendant or the purchaser.
Under the traditional legal requirement that the defendant have suf-
ficient market power in the tying product market to restrain competi-
36. See Cash v. Arctic Circle, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,095 (E.D. Wash. Dec.
14, 1979); Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 63,089 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14,
1979); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108, 119-20 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
37. See Cash v. Arctic Circle, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,095, at 77,443 (E.D.
Wash. Dec. 14, 1979).
38. The most common kind of competitor tying arrangement lawsuit arises when a manu-
facturer of the tied product alleges that the tying arrangement forecloses its ability to compete
for sales to those customers that purchase the tying product from the defendant. For example,
an independent manufacturer or seller of automobile air conditioners might object to an auto-
mobile manufacturer's requirement that the manufacturer itself approve or make all air condi-
tioners that its new car dealers install. See Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553
F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978). Competitor tying suits also have
occurred in the high technology computer industry when the defendant integrates two separate
products, which causes a competitor that manufactures one of the older products a loss of busi-
ness. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
In general, the substantive law of tying arrangements is the same whether the plaintiffs are
customers or competitors of the defendant. Certain elements of proof, however, are different in
competitors' suits. For example, competitors must prove not that the seller coerced them into
taking the tied product but that the seller forced its customers to do so. Thus, the location of
the plaintiffs in the defendant's market is not important in a competitor's suit. The plaintiff
competitor, however, must show that it competes with the defendant in the product and geo-
graphic markets for the tied product. In Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207 (9th
Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit analyzed the geographic market with respect to plaintiffs' claim
that defendant monopolized the market in grave memorials, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman
Act. The court, however, neglected to undertake a similar analysis in examining the claim that
defendant illegally tied the purchase of grave markers to the purchase of cemetery plots.
For an analysis suggesting that the individual coercion requirement is not an issue in tying
arrangement lawsuits brought by competitors, see Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
553 F.2d 964, 978 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978). For a discussion which
concludes that it is a requirement, see Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286,
289-91 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (Mar. 7, 1983 U.S.).
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tion in the tied product market, the court examines the market
power question from the seller's perspective and asks essentially the
same question it asks in monopoly cases: 9 does the defendant have
sufficient power in the relevant section of the country to reduce its
output and thereby raise its prices? The courts developed this re-
quirement to allow plaintiffs to show that the existence of an illegal,
presumably inefficient, tying arrangement is plausible, both under
the traditional leverage theory and with tying arrangements used to
permit price discrimination. 0 The assumption is that a seller with no
market power in the tying product market could not force buyers to
take an unwanted tied product; buyers simply would purchase the
tying product from an alternative source.41 If the alleged tying ar-
rangement actually creates efficiency, then the seller will be able to
impose the requirement whether or not it has market power in the
tying product market. Indeed, if competition in the market is intense
and the tying arrangement is extraordinarily efficiency creating, then
the seller's competitors may have to establish the "tying arrange-
ment" themselves or lose their share of the market.4
The most problematic element of the Second Circuit test that
courts have used to defeat class certification in tying cases is the re-
39. Although the question is essentially the same, courts generally consider the amount of
market power required in a tying case to be less than the amount that a plaintiff must show in
a monopoly case. See Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 494, 502-03 (1969)
(Fortner 1); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
40. See infra notes 77-122 and accompanying text for a discussion of price discrimination.
41. The courts have created several simplifying assumptions to determine the existence of
market power in the tying product. For example, if the tying product is patented or copy-
righted, a presumption of market power in the tying product arises. See United States Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 621 (1977) (Fortner II). Although some circuits believed
for a time that a trademark created the same presumption, they now hold otherwise. See Note,
Trademarks as Tying Products: The Presumption of Economic Power, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
689 (1976). Only the Fifth Circuit still appears to follow the doctrine that a trademark gives
rise to a presumption of market power. See Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration
Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1012-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); Matheson, supra
note 1, at 864 n.39. For an argument that some inefficient tie-ins are plausible even absent the
defendant's market power in the tying product, see Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competi-
tive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U.L. REv. 661 (1982).
42. For example, department stores can and do impose requirements that people buying
shirts take and pay for the buttons, that people who purchase left shoes also take and pay for
right shoes, and that people buying volume I of Karl Marx's Das Kapital also take and pay for
volumes II and III. The seller would not need "market power" to impose the requirement in
any of these instances. Similarly, a manufacturer of one new piece of equipment which per-
forms cheaper and better the same functions that two pieces of equipment performed before,
does not need market power to sell the new product. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Of course, if the new product is superior to the prod-
uct offered by any competitor, the new product itself may confer some market power on its
manufacturer, particularly if it is patented.
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quirement of "anticompetitive effects" in the market for the tied
product. A plaintiff must have sustained injury because it was forced
to purchase the tied product. That plaintiff must have preferred not
to have the tied product or to have obtained it elsewhere, perhaps at
a lower price. 43 The economic rationale for this requirement of the
law of tying arrangements is clear. Even a defendant that has market
power in an entire area does not have the power to raise prices with
every single buyer within that area. By reducing output to sell at a
higher price, the monopolist acknowledges that certain marginal buy-
ers will be unwilling to pay the higher price and will substitute away.
43. The "anticompetitive effects" in the market for the tied product are measurable in
two ways: First, by measuring the injury to a purchaser that either must buy the tied product
when it really would prefer not to have the product or must pay a higher price for the package
than the fair market value, and second, by measuring the injury to a competitor in the market
for the tied product that results when the competitor loses a sale, not because the defendant
has a more attractive product, but because of the defendant's tying arrangement.
Courts have employed different terms, such as "anticompetitive effects in the tied product
market," "fact of injury," or "coercion" to describe the effect that this necessary element of the
tying arrangement has on the plaintiff. Undoubtedly, the most frequently abused term is "coer-
cion," which courts have given widely different meanings. Some courts use it to determine
whether the tying arrangement actually required the plaintiff to take the tied product as a
condition of obtaining the tying product. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Re-
sponse, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1327 (5th Cir. 1976). Other courts use the term "coercion" to con-
vey that the defendant has market power in the tying product. See Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v.
Harco Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 1002-03 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975). Finally,
many courts use "coercion" to describe the foreclosure of options that faces the plaintiff-pur-
chaser as a result of the tying arrangement. Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d
658, 663 (2d Cir. 1974). Professor Matheson argues that the term "coercion" properly refers
only to the first two circumstances: the existence of the tie itself or of the market power of the
defendant. Although Professor Matheson observes correctly that the term "coercion" refers to
the plaintiff's obligation to take the tied product as a condition to receiving the tying product,
Matheson, supra note 1, at 866, the use of the term to describe the existence of the defendant's
market power in the tying product market is a misnomer. Someone who has market power is
not necessarily coercing anyone. Under traditional tying arrangement analysis, market power is
a prerequisite for coercion; it is not identical to coercion.
Courts that use a three part tying arrangement test do not have a separate "coercion"
requirement. By merging the questions of market power in the tying product and fact of injury,
however, they uniformly require that the plaintiff establish the latter element. See Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); supra note
25. Since the Siegel decision the Ninth Circuit seems to have had some difficulty in deciding
whether to apply a separate "coercion" requirement. In Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674
F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982), the court cited the Siegel test and
added in a footnote that only a "minority of courts" additionally require "some sort of anticom-
petitive effect in the market for the tied product." Id. at 1347 n.16. In Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins
Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982), however, the court set forth the Seigel test but
added the requirement of "some modicum of coercion." Id. at 1352 n.8. Since the court artiou-
lated as a separate requirement that the plaintiffs prove that the sale of the tying product was
conditioned on the sale of the tied product, "coercion" could not refer to that requirement. See
also Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d 1123, 1131 (6th Cir. 1981); Moore v. Jas. H.
Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Similarly, once a plaintiff in a tying arrangement case establishes suf-
ficient market power in the tying product market-that is, proves
that the tie-in is plausible for some reason other than efficiency-the
plaintiff still must prove that the defendant's exercise of its market
power injured it.
When a seller creates a tying arrangement for a purpose other
than price discrimination, buyers or potential buyers fall into three
categories: (1) Those that would have purchased the tying product
without the tying arrangement but substitute away once the seller
imposes the tying arrangement; (2) those that would have bought
both the tying and tied products from the same seller at the same
price anyway so that the seller's tie-in requirement is irrelevant; and
(3) those that would have preferred either not to purchase the tied
product at all or to buy it from a different seller, but that value the
tying product so highly that they take the tied product to receive the
tying product. All tying arrangements produce these three sets of
purchasers or potential purchasers, regardless of the degree of the
seller's market power.44
Although the buyers in the first category-those that opt
away-almost certainly suffer economic harm from the defendant's
tying arrangement, they probably do not have a cause of action be-
cause the link between their injury and the defendant's activity is too
remote. In other words, a nonpurchaser will have great difficulty
proving any injury from the tying arrangement.45
44. This division occurs even when the tying arrangement is efficiency creating. See infra
notes 123-49 and accompanying text. In some instances, however, one or more of the three sets
may be empty. For example, certain tying arrangements created to avoid maximum price regu-
lation-such as a gasoline seller's requirement that all gasoline purchasers buy a rabbit's foot
for $5-may produce an empty category of customers that would have preferred to take both
tying and tied products even absent the tying arrangement. See infra text accompanying note
64.
45. In Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979),
plaintiff, Murray, alleged that he bought a cartelized product from a nonmember of the cartel
who charged a higher than competitive price because the cartel increased the general price level
in the market. Id. at 580. Although Murray's economics were plausible, the Third Circuit held
that Murray was not within the "target area" of the antitrust violation, and that a "tenuous
line of causation [existed] between defendants' price-fixing and the prices paid by Murray."
Furthermore, the court found that "defendants secured no illegal benefit at Murray's expense
... "since any profit that defendants received from membership in the cartel came from cus-
tomers that actually purchased from the cartel; conversely, any costs to Murray accrued as
benefits not to the violators but to their competitors. Id. at 583. The Third Circuit concluded
that the problem of tracing the overcharge would be at least as difficult with a nonpurchaser as
with an indirect purchaser. See Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
The Tenth Circuit engaged in similar analysis in Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661
F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1634 (1982), when it denied standing to
plaintiff which alleged that it was unable to purchase from defendants because they were en-
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The purchasers in the second category-those that would have
taken both the tying and tied products even without a tie-in-simply
do not suffer injury. If the tying arrangement creates and passes on
no efficiencies to them and if it imposes no undesired requirements
on them, they are neither better off nor worse off as a result of the
tie-in. Any legal requirement that a plaintiff in a tying case show ei-
ther injury in fact or that the seller actually "coerced" the plaintiff
into taking the tied product must be designed to deny purchasers in
this class a cause of action.46
Finally, those buyers forced to take the tied product against
their will are the ones that can show competitive injury or coercion.
In all purchaser-plaintiff cases, a class action certification require-
ment that the plaintiffs as a group show injury in fact, or coercion,
must identify and separate this particular group of buyers.
When the purpose of the tie-in is price discrimination, purchas-
ers or potential purchasers generally are separable into four catego-
ries: (1) Those that are better off because of the tie-in price discrimi-
nation scheme; (2) those that are neither better off nor worse off (this
set of purchasers may be very small or it may be empty); (3) those
that are worse off as a result of the tie-in price discrimination scheme
but choose to buy from the seller anyway;47 and (4) those that would
be worse off as a result of the tie-in price discrimination scheme but
that choose not to buy. Again, the law probably denies people in the
fourth category a cause of action, even though the tie-in price dis-
crimination scheme injures them. 48 Clearly the buyers in category
three ought to have a cause of action, provided that tying arrange-
ments created to permit price discrimination are illegal.49 The pur-
gaged in a conspiracy to reduce output and raise prices. As part of the alleged conspiracy,
defendants refused to sell to new customers. The court held that plaintiff had no standing since
no established course of dealing existed between plaintiff and defendants. To hold otherwise,
the court noted, would permit an almost infinite number of plaintiffs in price-fixing suits, which
would drive the defendants into bankruptcy. Id. at 868; see In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceed-
ings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1982); Berger & Bernstein, An
Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977).
46. See E.B.E., Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, 387 F. Supp. 737, 738-39 (E.D. Mich.
1971).
47. Some courts have attempted to identify this group of buyers by inquiring whether the
plaintiff was "overcharged"--in other words, whether the price that the defendant charged for
the tied product exceeded fair market value or whether the defendant's price for the package
exceeded the sum of the fair market values of the tying and tied products. Presumably, no
buyer would prefer to purchase a tied package if the individual components were available
separately at a lower price. See Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 127 (1982).
48. See supra note 45.
49. The issue whether tying to permit price discrimination ought to be illegal has been a
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chasers in categories one and two should not have a cause of action
against the seller. Some courts, however, have permitted these buyers
to join in class action tying arrangement litigation and have not dis-
tinguished them from the purchasers in category three."
In summary, not all buyers and potential buyers of a tied pack-
age necessarily suffer injury from an illegal tying arrangement. Con-
sequently, the most problematic class action certification issue in the
law of tying arrangements is the legal requirement of injury in fact,
or economic coercion. The analysis that follows pertains predomi-
nantly to the "common question" requirement of this fact of injury
or coercion issue.
III. CLASS ACTIONS AND THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF TYING
ARRANGEMENTS
A. The Leverage Theory
The leverage theory, which is perhaps the oldest judicial eco-
nomic theory about the operation of tying arrangements and their
harms, states that a seller with significant monopoly power in one
product-the tying product-can use a tying arrangement to create a
second monopoly in the tied product and thereby reap two sets of
monopoly profits instead of one. The Supreme Court applied this ra-
tionale in IBM v. United States.51 Defendant IBM had monopoly
power in the market for its computation machines but not in the
market for the perforated paper cards that the machines used. The
Supreme Court explained that by requiring all lessees of its machines
to use IBM paper cards, defendant obtained a virtual monopoly in
both the cards and the machines.2
If the leverage theory were valid, it not only would explain many
tying arrangements, but also would supply a suitable "common ques-
tion" basis for class certification on the injury in fact issue in tie-in
class actions. Under the leverage theory a tying arrangement injures
all customers of the tying seller in the same way because the seller
requires them all to pay a monopoly price for both the tying and tied
products. Presumably, the amount of their injury would equal the
difference between the fair market value of the tied product in a
competitive market and the price they actually paid for the tied
subject of some dispute in law review commentary, although courts generally have found the
practice to be a violation of the antitrust laws. See infra note 81.
50. See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
51. IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
52. Id. at 135-36.
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product, multiplied by the amount of the tied product that they pur-
chased. Some courts, however, have held that the purchaser's dam-
ages equal the difference between the price of the entire package in a
competitive market and the price that the plaintiff paid for the pack-
age. This theory suggests that if a seller uses a tying arrangement,
the monopoly price in the tying product becomes illegal even though
that price alone would be legal without the tie-in. 3
Unfortunately, as economists and lawyers have argued for the
past twenty-five years, the leverage theory of tie-ins rests upon an
erroneous economic theory and cannot plausibly explain a significant
number of tying arrangements." For example, although IBM, which
owned an absolute monopoly in calculating machines that used paper
cards, might be able to increase its market share in the market for
paper cards with a tie-in, it could not necessarily increase its monop-
oly profits. Unless IBM is the most efficient manufacturer of the pa-
per cards, it actually will lose money.
All lessees of IBM's computation machines also purchase cards.
The profit-maximizing price of the machines, therefore, is the lease
price that produces the largest amount of revenue when the cards are
sold competitively. The customers purchase a package of computa-
tion services. Hence, they attribute a price increase in either ma-
chines or cards to the package itself. For a purchaser that requires
both elements of the package, the difference between a $1 increase in
the price of one element and a $1 increase in the price of the other
element is immaterial. In either instance the price of the package in-
creases by $1. To illustrate, if the profit-maximizing price of using
the computation machine for a year is $900, and the competitive
price of a year's supply of cards is $100, then customers are paying
$1000 for the combination.5 5 By computing its profit-maximizing
price for the machine at $900, the seller of the machines has deter-
mined that any increase in the price of the machines-to $925, for
53. In the absence of the tying arrangement, the monopoly price of the tying product
alone would be legal, provided it did not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act or another antitrust
statute. See Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 127 (1982); infra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waf-
fle House, Inc., No. 78-223A (N.D. Ga. Dec. 30, 1982).
54. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 10, at 365-81; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 171-84 (1976); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 62
(1960); Markovits, supra note 5, at 1363-1409; Posner, supra note 11; Hirsh v. Martindale-
Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 n.19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982). But see
Bauer, supra note 11, at 292-305.
55. This discussion assumes that all users of the computation machine require the same
number of cards and that the seller did not create the tying arrangement for price discrimina-
tion or metering purposes.
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example,-will reduce the seller's profit. The demand for the ma-
chine will decrease and revenues will diminish by an amount greater
than the price increase will cover. Precisely the same result would
occur, however, if the price of cards were to increase from $100 to
$125. The price of the package would rise $25, and demand would fall
by exactly the same amount as if the price of cards remained con-
stant but the cost of the machine increased $25.
As the seller of the computation machines, IBM can maximize
its profits by ensuring that the price of the cards is competitive. If a
seller can produce and sell cards for $90 instead of $100, IBM would
be wise to encourage that seller to do so, because when the price of
cards drops, the profit-maximizing price of the computation ma-
chines will rise. The sale of the cards by IBM itself would be profita-
ble only if it were a more efficient supplier of cards than its competi-
tors. In that instance, however, the lessor of the machines would not
need a tying arrangement to make the sales. The customers of IBM's
machines would naturally buy cards from IBM if IBM's cards were
cheaper than those of any other supplier. This situation might arise if
a cartel controlled the market for the cards and fixed the price at
$125 rather than at the competitive price of $100. By selling the
cards at $100, IBM could deprive the card cartel of its profits. If IBM
were selling cards more cheaply than its competitors, however, it
would not need to require its lessees to purchase the cards as a condi-
tion of taking the machine."
56. A seller might use a tying arrangement to obtain a certain kind of "leverage" when
the seller has market power in the tying product and a cartel controls the market for the tied
product. For example, assume that the tying product is bottles; lids are the tied product and for
each bottle most purchasers require one lid. The two products are obtainable from separate
sellers. The lids would have a competitive price of 10t but sell for 15t because of a successful
cartel. If the seller has market power in the bottle market but does not sell lids, it must predi-
cate its profit-maximizing price on a 15t price for lids due to the cartel. Alternatively, if the
price of lids were to fall to 10t, the bottle seller would be able to obtain a higher profit-maxi-
mizing price for its bottles. If the combination of one bottle plus one lid sells for 50t, purchas-
ers do not care whether the bottle and lid producers apportion 35t to the bottle and 15t to the
lid or 40t to the bottle and 10t to the lid.
Assume that the seller acquires the capacity to manufacture enough lids to satisfy the
needs of its own bottle customers. If the seller raises the price of bottles to 40t, sells lids at the
competitive price of 10t, and undercuts the cartel, customers will line up to buy the seller's
lids, even though they might be buying their bottles elsewhere. As a result of the seller's inabil-
ity to meet the sudden increased demand for lids, some customers will have to buy their lids
from the cartel. Because the seller's price for bottles is 40t, not 35t, these customers will not
buy their bottles from the seller. One risky alternative would be for the seller to increase its lid
capacity. If the lid cartel terminates, however, the seller may have more capacity than is profit-
able. The better solution would be for the seller to continue to sell bottles at 35t but price its
lids at the cartel price of 15t, even though it is not a member of the cartel. The seller would be
competing with the cartel, and some of its customers might prefer to buy bottles from the seller
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Conversely, if IBM were a somewhat less efficient producer of
cards than the competing producers, the tie-in would cost IBM
money. If, for example, the competitive price for cards is $100 but
IBM could not profitably make and sell them for less than $110 be-
cause of production inefficiencies, the company would lose money by
manufacturing the cards and imposing a tying arrangement. IBM's
sale of cards at $110 would be no more profitable than a competitor's
sale of cards at $100 because the production inefficiencies would eat
up the higher price, and IBM's profit-maximizing price for the com-
putation machines would be lower because of the higher price that its
customers were paying for the cards.
In short, if IBM has a monopoly in computation machines, but
the market for cards is competitive, then IBM will realize the great-
est profit when the cards are sold in the most efficient competitive
market at the lowest possible price. If IBM is the most efficient card
supplier, it will be able to sell its product without imposing a tying
arrangement. If, however, another company is more efficient, IBM
could allow the other company to sell the cards more profitably than
it could require IBM customers to purchase all their cards from IBM.
Although the leverage theory of tying arrangements has no eco-
nomic merit,57 courts nevertheless apply it as a rationale for tying
arrangements." Consequently, it may explain certain judicial rules
defining the injury that a tying arrangement causes to a purchaser.
For example, in 1982 the United States Court of Appeals for the
at 35t, but lids from a member of the cartel at 15t. Through a tie-in the seller can sell all its
lids and bottles at maximum profit by putting the bottles and lids together in a package and
selling them for 50t. By entering the lid market, the seller is able to increase its monopoly
profits by 5c, not because it has greater monopoly power than before, but because it can trans-
fer the monopoly profits earned by the cartel away from the cartel to itself.
57. But see Bauer, supra note 11, at 297-301. In support of the leverage theory Professor
Bauer argues that if the tied product is competitive and heavily advertised, then a seller by
imposing a tying arrangement would be able to sell the tied product at the competitive price
but avoid the advertising or marketing cost. The seller thus would reap a supracompetitive rate
of return. Id. at 229. This argument is fallacious, however, because if the competitors are
spending their advertising money efficiently, consumers will be assigning to their products a
value that reflects the advertising disbursements. Professor Bauer assumes that consumers are
indifferent to whether they purchase a heavily advertised item or a comparable unadvertised
item. That lack of preference permits a seller to use a tying arrangement to avoid the costs of
advertising the tied product. If customers really are indifferent, however, then the competitor is
wasting the money it spends for advertising. A seller does not advertise unless it expects to
create consumer preference for the advertised product.
58. The Ninth Circuit, however, recently suggested that the leverage theory is discredita-
ble and no longer should serve as a judicial rationale for condemning tying arrangements. See
Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 n.19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
305 (1982).
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Eleventh Circuit in Kypta v. McDonald's Corp. held that to prove
injury from a tie-in a plaintiff must show that the "payments for
both the tied and tying products exceeded their combined fair mar-
ket value." 59 Although this test may also describe the economic con-
sequences of a tying arrangement created to permit price discrimina-
tion, the Kypta opinion contains no evidence that the Eleventh
Circuit believed that defendant's tying arrangement was part of a
price discrimination scheme. The Eleventh Circuit did not explain
why defendant would use a tie-in to establish its profit-maximizing
price rather than simply charge a higher price for the tying product.
The court, however, did acknowledge that raising the tying product
price to the profit-maximizing level was an alternative available to
defendant. The court concluded that plaintiff had to do more than
show that the value of the tied product alone was less than the price
plaintiff paid, because "a lower price might conceivably have been
exacted by the franchisor for the tying product."60 The court ap-
peared to establish the impossible requirement that to prove injury
in a tying case the plaintiff-purchaser must show that the defendant
sold the tied product at a supracompetitive price in a situation in
which it could not raise the price of the tying product.61
Clearly, if the leverage theory were valid and a seller not engaged
in price discrimination could use a tying arrangement to enlarge its
monopoly profits, then the fact of injury would be uniform for all
purchasers of the tying arrangement, as it is for all purchasers that
buy from a cartel. Under the leverage theory all purchasers are vic-
tims of a monopoly overcharge created by a tying arrangement. Un-
fortunately, several courts have certified tie-in class actions based on
the fallacious economic theory that tie-ins permit leverage. 2
59. Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
127 (1982) (citing Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972)).
60. Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
127 (1982).
61. The defendant could do this if it were using the tying arrangement to avoid maximum
price regulation in the market for the tying product. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying
text. Such price regulation was not present in Kypta. Alternatively, the defendant might have
been engaging in price discrimination and using the supracompetitive price in the tied product
to avoid raising the price of the tying product to the nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing level.
See infra notes 77-122 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Sandles v. Ruben, 89 F.R.D. 635 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Martino v. McDonald's
Sys., 86 F.R.D. 145 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Rental Car of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 496 F. Supp. 373 (D. Mass. 1980); Fifth Moorings Condominium, Inc. v. Shere, 81 F.R.D.
712 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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B. The Use of Tying Arrangements to Evade Price Regulation
A seller in a price-regulated market might want to evade price
regulation for two reasons. First, if the regulated price is artifically
low, the seller may believe that it can maximize its profits by charg-
ing a higher price. Second, if the regulated price is artificially high,
the seller may increase its profits by selling at a lower price. Use of a
tie-in to evade price regulation in the first instance generally injures
the customers of the evader. By creating a tying arrangement in the
second instance, a seller usually injures its competitors in the tying
product. If the evader has a statutory monopoly, then use of the ty-
ing arrangements for either reason can injure competitors in the tied
product by creating a type of leverage. s
As an example of the first kind of evasion, Judge -Posner and
Professor Easterbrook recount the story of a Chicago gasoline station
operator during a recent gasoline shortage.6 4 Federal law regulated
the maximum retail pump price of gasoline and created an artifically
low price. The operator sold the gasoline at its maximum legal price
but required each customer to purchase a rabbit's foot for $5. Since
the retail demand for gasoline exceeded the supply at the regulated
price, the dealer had sufficient legally created "market power" to suc-
ceed with the scheme even at a price substantially higher than the
legal maximum. Given that the rabbit's foot had a fair market value
far below $5, the dealer's motive clearly was to make more profit on
gasoline sales than the price regulations permitted.6 5 If the fair mar-
63. See infra text accompanying note 68.
64. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONoMic NoTEs AND OTHER
MATERIALS 809 (2d ed. 1981).
65. See id. Judge Posner and Professor Easterbrook suggest that defendant in United
States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977), created the tying arrangement
at issue for the same purpose. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 64, at 835. Plaintiffs
alleged that defendant tied the sale of prefabricated houses to the granting of loans for the
purchase and development of land upon which the houses were to be placed. Defendant re-
quired payment of an above-market price for the houses. If, as Judge Posner and Professor
Easterbrook suggest, state usury laws were setting a below-market interest rate, defendant
could have been using the arrangement evasively to transfer part of the return on the loan to
the price of the prefabricated house. See In re Use of the Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968).
Certain regulated utilities, such as telephone companies, may require customers to
purchase all their terminal equipment (for example, telephones, extension cords, and recording
devices) from the utilities themselves, because they can charge a supracompetitive price for
these devices and thereby evade the maximum price regulation for the phone line. This activity
injures not only the telephone company's customers but also competing sellers of the terminal
devices. See Litton Systems v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983); White
Directory Pub., Inc. v. New York Tel. Co., No. 78-224 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1982); Phonetele, Inc.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3526 (Jan.
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ket value of the rabbit's foot was 25¢, the tying arrangement injured
each consumer in the amount of $4.75 per gasoline purchase. A court
in this instance should hold that common questions predominate and
allow a class action lawsuit against the dealer.
Litigation arises more frequently in cases concerning the use of
tying arrangements to evade price regulation when the evader em-
ploys the tying arrangement to lower the price of the regulated com-
modity. For example, assume that during the years of airline price
regulation federal law fixed the price of a flight from San Francisco
to Austin, Texas, at $100. Pacific Airlines, which flies that particular
route, charges $100 but has many empty seats. Pacific determines
that by charging $80 it could fill its planes and make more money. It
offers its customers a package consisting of a ticket from San Fran-
cisco to Austin for $100 and, for an additional $1, a night in a $20
Austin hotel. In this particular case the "tying" product is the hotel
room and the "tied" product is the airline ticket. While Pacific Air-
lines will sell the trip to Austin without the hotel room for $100, it
will not sell the hotel room in Austin for $1 without the purchase of
the air ticket. The chief victims of Pacific Airlines' scheme are, of
course, its competitors that have a route from San Francisco to Aus-
tin at a regulated price of $100. ee These airlines all have been injured
in the same way by defendant's tying arrangements.6
If the seller imposing the tie-in in a price-regulated market has a
legally protected monopoly in the tying product, and only a limited
market for the tied product exists among buyers that do not
purchase the tying product, then the tying arrangement can harm
competitors in the tied product regardless of the seller's motive for
imposing the tying arrangement. For example, an electric utility that
requires all its customers to purchase lightbulbs with their electric-
ity68 or a telephone line company that requires customers to buy its
terminal equipment 9 can cause injury to competitors that sell
18, 1983 U.S.); Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
66. See Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941); Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
United States, 305 U.S. 507 (1939); Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys.,
491 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Hawaii 1980).
67. But see Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 491 F. Supp. 1199
(D. Hawaii 1980). Courts frequently have found injuries to competitors under the leverage the-
ory but in the one instance when inefficient injury to competitors by means of a tie-in was
plausible, the court failed to recognize it. This failure was due largely to the court's confusion of
the tying product with the tied product.
68. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); White Directory Pub., Inc. v.
New York Tel. Co., No. 78-224 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1982).
69. See Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3526 (Jan. 18, 1983 U.S.); In re Use of the Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d
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lightbulbs or telephone instruments. In these cases the injury accrues
not because the defendant is evading the price regulation at the ex-
pense of buyers or competitors, but because the -legal monopolist's
tying arrangement forecloses competition in the market for the tied
product. In short, the price-regulated monopoly provides an instance
in which a modified version of the leverage theory works: a seller with
a legal monopoly in one (regulated) product can create a virtual mo-
nopoly in a second (unregulated) product and obtain monopoly prof-
its that the price regulation otherwise would deny it.
Tying arrangements in price-regulated industries may be effi-
ciency creating. For example, the airlines' flight-hotel scheme actu-
ally may fill airplanes at a price that is profitable to the airlines and
provides a more efficient allocation of resources than did price regula-
tion. The recent substantial deregulation of airline industry prices
supports this notion.70 Nevertheless, in general, efficiency should not
be a defense when the purpose of the tying arrangement obviously is
to evade the statutory regulation. The legislature and the relevant
regulatory agency already have decided how best to allocate resources
in that market. If the activity is within the jurisdiction of the anti-
trust laws, 71 the courts should condemn the tie-in regardless of any
420 (1968); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.
1975).
70. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in
various sections of 49 U.S.C.); Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Performance, 1972 BELL
J. ECON. 399; Panzar, Regulation, Deregulation, and Economic Efficiency: The Case of the
CAB, 69 AMER. ECON. REV. 311 (1980). In general, evasion of price regulation is likely to be
efficient when the evader's profit-maximizing price is lower than the regulated price, because
the evasion will benefit consumers, at least in the short run. Evasion of price regulation is likely
to be inefficient when the evader's profit-maximizing price is higher than the regulated price,
since the evasion will constitute an increase in the seller's monopoly rents at the expense of its
customers. The single exception to this latter rule occurs when the regulated price is lower than
the seller's marginal cost-that is, when the regulatory authority presumably made an error
and imposed an unprofitable price on the price-regulated industry.
71. In some instances a seller's activities in a price-regulated market are exempt from the
antitrust laws. This exemption generally falls under the rubric of "implied immunity" if the
price regulation is federal, and under the "state action" doctrine if a state imposes the regula-
tion. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943); Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3526 (Jan. 18, 1983 U.S.); Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 631
F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980); Essential Communications Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 F.2d
1114 (3d Cir. 1979); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913
(9th Cir. 1975); Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARv. L.
REv. 435 (1981); Note, The Application of Antitrust Law to Telecommunications, 69 CALIF. L.
REv. 497 (1981); Note, AT & T and the Antitrust Laws: A Strict Test for Implied Immunity,
85 YALE L.J. 254 (1975).
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defense that avoidance of the statutory price regulation is efficient.
Clearly, the issue of the seller's market power in the tying prod-
uct should be irrelevant in cases concerning tying arrangements cre-
ated to evade price regulation. The price regulation acts as a substi-
tute for market power. If the regulated price is higher than the
defendant's profit-maximizing price, the price regulation statute pro-
hibits others from competing with the tying arrangement without vi-
olating the price regulation statute themselves. When the regulated
price is lower than the defendant's profit-maximizing price, the statu-
tory regulation creates artificial shortages that permit the defendant
to sell at a price higher than the law permits through the use of tying
arrangements. For example, the gasoline dealer that foists a rabbit's
foot upon its customers may have far less than one percent of the
retail gasoline market in Chicago and would have no market power if
competition determined prices. The price regulation statute, how-
ever, creates a dislocation between the price of gasoline and the de-
mand and gives the dealer a perfect substitute for the market power
requirement in tying cases.
It follows, therefore, that in a tying arrangement the purpose of
which is to thwart the consequences of price regulation, questions of
"market power" and fact of injury are common to all members of the
class. If the class members can show by common proof that they all
were required to take the tied product, then a court should certify
the class.
C. The Use of Tying Arrangements to Conceal or Facilitate
Predatory Pricing
A seller can engage in predatory pricing in two ways: By lowering
the price of a product, or by maintaining the price while improving
the quality of the product or adding some special service at less than
cost. The latter technique may constitute a tying arrangement. To
illustrate, a grocery store might engage in predatory pricing by leav-
ing its retail grocery prices unchanged but offering free delivery of all
purchases. If the price charged for the groceries plus the delivery is
less than the seller's average variable cost, then the defendant may
be engaging in predatory pricing under the Areeda-Turner test.7 2 The
72. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 154 (1978); Areeda & Turner, Preda-
tory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HAnv. L. RE V. 697
(1975). The Areeda-Turner test, which suggests that a price below reasonably anticipated aver-
age variable cost is illegal, does not distinguish predatory pricing accomplished by lowering the
price of a product from predatory pricing achieved by adding an extra product or service to the
package, provided that the defendant's average variable cost reflects the cost of the additional
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combination of groceries plus delivery is a "tying arrangement" be-
cause the grocery store will not make a delivery unless the buyer also
purchases groceries there. Sellers might use tie-ins to facilitate preda-
tion in price-regulated industries, in which the seller cannot legally
lower the price of its product but may be able to attach a service at a
price lower than the cost of delivering the service.7 s
Although concealment or facilitation of predatory pricing may
explain certain tying arrangements, a class action tie-in lawsuit in
which the plaintiffs allege predatory pricing is implausible. A seller is
unlikely to be able to engage in predatory pricing against a group of
competitors so large that it warrants class action consideration. Such
a case might arise if, for example, a defendant has forty percent of a
market and sixty competitors have one percent each. The giant might
attempt to drive out the pygmies through predatory pricing.7' Never-
theless, most predatory pricing cases to date have consisted of a soli-
tary plaintiff or a small group of plaintiffs.
A possible exception to this general rule exists: a class action
predatory pricing suit brought by customers of the predator. The
modern law of predatory pricing rests on the assumption that the
ultimate victims of predation are not the competitors of the predator,
but its customers. Indeed, Professors Areeda and Turner base their
test for predatory pricing on the premise that a seller will engage in
predatory pricing only if it has a reasonable belief that it can sell
below cost to dispatch competitors from the market, then recoup all
losses encountered during the predatory period by selling at a mo-
nopoly price, and still realize a profit. 5 A group of consumers that
must pay monopoly prices as a result of a seller's previous removal of
all competition through predation should have a cause of action
product or service. Professors Areeda and Turner do discuss the problem of additional services
provided at below marginal cost as a form of predatory pricing. See id. at 728; see Easterbrook,
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHL L. REV. 263, 304-12 (1981); Ordover &
Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8
(1981).
73. See, e.g., Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980).
74. Predatory pricing in this circumstance, however, is extremely implausible. Predatory
pricing generally will not be successful in a market in which barriers to entry are low, because
the predatory activity will be profitable only if the predator can enjoy a substantial period of
supracompetitive pricing once it removes its rivals from the market. The presence of 40 firms in
a market, each with a one percent share, suggests low barriers to entry. See Brodley & Hay,
Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 738, 742 (1981).
75. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 72, at 151; Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1031 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982).
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under the antitrust laws.78 Plaintiffs likely will file such a lawsuit as a
monopolization action under section 2 of the Sherman Act rather
than as a tying arrangement case under section 3 of the Clayton Act.
The group of customers paying the higher price is a victim not of a
tie-in but of the prior use of a tie-in to perpetrate a successful
scheme of predatory pricing.
D. Tying Arrangements as Metering or Price Discrimination
Devices
Sellers commonly use tying arrangements as metering or price
discrimination devices. 7 Although economists almost universally
view metering and price discrimination as principle functions of tying
arrangements, few federal courts have analyzed tie-ins in this way.78
Rather, courts generally consider the issue whether a seller is using a
tying arrangement to facilitate metering or price discrimination as ir-
relevant to the determination of legality. Consequently, little law ex-
ists that specifies the circumstances under which a seller can employ
a tie-in as a metering or price discrimination device. An unfortunate
situation arises when a seller uses a tying arrangement for nondis-
criminatory metering, because this metering serves as an alternative
to more costly or less reliable metering mechanisms. Tie-ins that per-
mit the seller to engage in nondiscriminatory metering are socially
efficient, and the antitrust laws should not condemn their use.7 9
The social utility of a price discrimination tying arrangement, on
the other hand, is controversial. As a general rule, a seller must have
market power to price discriminate. If the seller has no market
power, disfavored purchasers-those asked to pay more than the
competitive price-will buy elsewhere. The purpose of many of the
tying arrangements that plaintiffs have litigated clearly has been to
extract a higher rate of return from high-use or high-preference pur-
chasers of a certain product than from low-use or low-preference pur-
76. To date, no class of plaintiffs has brought such a lawsuit. But see Interview with
Robert Tollison, FTC Chief Economist, 43 ANTPTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 609, 613
(Sept. 30, 1982); Easterbrook, supra note 72, at 331-33.
77. See Bowman, supra note 11; Markovits, supra note 5, at 1407-10; Posner, supra note
11, at 509-15.
78. But see United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 617 n.7 (1977)
(Fortner II); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 513 (1969) (Fortner I)
(White, J., dissenting); Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.
1977).
79. For an economic argument to support this viewpoint, see Markovits, supra note 5, at
1439-40.
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chasers.8 0 Whether the antitrust laws ought to condemn this practice
depends on one's view of the appropriate social goals of the antitrust
laws. Price discrimination sometimes results in an efficient allocation
of resources and thus may provide some social benefit."' The practice
of price discrimination does not necessarily require a reduction of
output. On the contrary, price discrimination often encourages a
seller with market power to increase its output by enabling the seller
to include in its market marginal purchasers that would not have
80. A tying arrangement facilitates economic price discrimination when the ratio of pack-
age price to marginal cost varies from one customer to the next. R. POSNER, supra note 54, at
62. Price discrimination provides the best economic explanation of the tying arrangements at
issue in many classic tie-in cases. See, e.g., IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (tying
punch cards to computing machines); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912) (tying paper
and ink to mimeograph machines); Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Paper Co., 152
U.S. 425 (1894) (tying toilet paper to dispensers); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v.
Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) (tying buttons to button-fastening machinery).
But see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Defendant in Interna-
tional Salt may have created the tying arrangement to effectuate quality control not price dis-
crimination. Defendant executed a contract with its buyers that permitted the buyers to
purchase salt from a competitor if the competitor offered salt of the same quality and price. By
forcing itself to sell the tied product at a competitive price, defendant was unlikely engaging in
price discrimination. Id. at 396-97; see Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22 J.L. & EcoN.
351 (1979).
81. For an argument that the use of tying arrangements to price discriminate is not ineffi-
cient but merely facilitates a transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers, see Stigler, United
States v. Loew's, Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 152, 152-54 (1963). One
commentator has argued that price discrimination by tying arrangement may or may not be
efficient, depending upon the circumstances. See Markovits, supra note 7, at 1406-08. For an
argument that price discrimination by tying arrangement generally is inefficient, see Posner,
supra note 11, at 509-15.
A problem arises with any practice that requires the defendant to have a certain amount of
market power. Any rational profit-maximizing business will be willing to spend a certain
amount of its resources to acquire the necessary market power, and this expenditure of re-
sources is frequently a social loss. For example, a company that makes false statements about
its product or destroys a competitor's plant to acquire the necessary market power to enable it
to price discriminate imposes a considerable loss upon society. What appears to be merely a
transfer of wealth from consumers to producers facilitated by market power actually may be a
destruction of resources if the seller expends 90% of the producer surplus created by the exer-
tion of its market power in obtaining that power. See R. POSNER, supra note 54, at 8-22.
One answer to Judge Posner's argument is that firms do not always spend their money in a
socially inefficient way to obtain market power. For example, innovation that results in a pat-
ented invention can create considerable market power, and the innovation itself is efficient if
the invention creates a social value that is greater than the cost of developing and producing
the new product. In many tying cases the defendant possesses market power in the tying prod-
uct because it holds the patent in the product. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). Moreover, when a seller already has
market power in a product, discriminatory pricing of the product, which permits the seller to
make all sales above marginal cost, may be more efficient than forcing the seller to offer its
product at its nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price. The latter situation would restrict
output.
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purchased the product at the seller's nondiscriminatory profit-maxi-
mizing price but that will buy it at cost or at a price between cost
and the nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price.82 Consequently,
many economists agree that price discrimination does not always
misallocate resources. Nevertheless, the device does transfer wealth
away from the purchasers of a product and to the price-discriminat-
ing seller."' If the underlying and exclusive goal of the antitrust laws
ought to be the condemnation of inefficient practices, then, arguably,
price discrimination often is not an antitrust problem. If, however,
the goal of the antitrust laws should be to maximize the welfare of
consumers, then perhaps price discrimination is socially harmful be-
cause it transfers wealth away from consumers to producers.8 4
82. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. Price discrimination is "perfect" when
every sale is made to a purchaser at the maximum price that the purchaser is willing to pay,
and every purchaser willing to pay a profitable price buys the product. Output is as large under
perfect price discrimination as it is under perfect competition; hence it is greater than the
output of a monopolist charging its nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price. See G. STIGLER,
THE THEORY OF PRICE 212-14 (3d ed. 1966). In the real world, however, price discrimination is
always imperfect, for the seller cannot possibly identify the value that each individual customer
places on a product and sufficiently isolate the customer to make the sale at that price. At best,
real world sellers can identify different groups of customers that place different values on the
product and make sales at the profit-maximizing price to each group. This practice may enable
the monopolist to enlarge output if at least one set of sales is made at a price lower than the
monopolist's nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price. Alternatively, the monopolist may
price discriminate, but only within the group of customers willing to pay more than the nondis-
criminatory profit-maximizing price. Consequently, any generalization whether real world price
discrimination results in enlarged or reduced output is impossible. See J. ROBINSON, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 188-95 (1933).
83. See supra authorities cited note 81.
84. But see R. BORK, supra note 10. Judge Bork argues both that "maximization of con-
sumer welfare" ought to be the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws, id. at 107-15, and that tying
arrangements designed to effect price discrimination ought to be legal, id. at 380. In his discus-
sion of the Robinson-Patman Act, id. at 395-98, Judge Bork reasons that since longterm price
discrimination requires market power, the seller that is considering price discrimination has
two choices: Reduce output and sell at its profit-maximizing price, or price discriminate. A
seller that chooses to price discriminate will not need to reduce output because, assuming near-
perfect price discrimination, it will be able to make a sale to every customer willing to pay
marginal cost. Indeed, Judge Bork argues that price discrimination by a seller with market
power actually encourages the seller to increase output. Since consumers benefit from efficient
allocation of resources, price discrimination increases consumer welfare. The flaw in Judge
Bork's argument is that efficient resource allocation may not always benefit buyers and price
discrimination by tying arrangements may simply be one of the exceptions. Consumer prefer-
ences are not consistent, and a benefit to one class of consumers will be a detriment to another
class. In fact, price discrimination divides consumers into two groups: Those that are better off
because they can obtain the product for less than its profit-maximizing price, and those that
are worse off because they must pay more than the profit-maximizing price. If the injuries
suffered by the latter group are greater than the benefits received by the former group, price
discrimination does not increase consumer welfare. This conclusion is particularly true if one
additionally believes that the social welfare losses that result from nondiscriminatory monopoly
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Some sellers find price discrimination by tying arrangement at-
tractive because they can accomplish it without violating the Robin-
son-Patman Act.85 Although courts and commentators refer to the
evil that the Robinson-Patman Act condemns as "price discrimina-
tion," that statute actually forbids price differences.8 6 Economic price
discrimination occurs when a seller obtains a higher rate of return
from one buyer than it does from another buyer, regardless whether
the prices charged to both buyers were identical. Violation of the ba-
sic provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, however, only results
when a seller charges two or more purchasers different prices for the
same product.8 7 Although the Robinson-Patman Act permits a defen-
dant to show that a price difference was not economically discrimina-
tory because it was cost justified, the statute does not recognize that
the sale of a product to two different purchasers at the same price
can be economic price discrimination. This circumstance arises when
a seller effects the price discrimination by a tying arrangement.
1. Fixed Proportion and Variable Proportion Tie-ins
Tying arrangements come in two kinds: Fixed proportion and va-
riable proportion. In a fixed proportion tie-in every consumer uses a
fixed amount of the tied product with a fixed quantity of the tying
product. For example, a shoe seller requires that a purchaser of a left
shoe also take a right shoe. Similarly, a hardware store obliges a cus-
tomer that purchases a bolt also to buy a nut. Under most circum-
stances consumers use a single right shoe with a single left shoe, a
pricing are relatively small. Cf. Goldberg, Welfare Loss and Monopoly: the Unmaking of an
Estimate, 16 EcoN. INQUmY 310 (1978); Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM.
ECON. REv. 77 (1954); Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HAuv. L. REv.
937, 954 (1981); Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. PoL. ECON. 807
(1975); Stigler, The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger, 64 J. POL. ECON. 33 (1956).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). Since the Robinson-Patman Act applies only to sales, not
leases, the statute would not apply to lease-ties.
86. The Robinson-Patman Act makes "[i]t unlawful to discriminate in price between dif-
ferent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality .... ." The Supreme Court estab-
lished in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549-50 (1960), that the statute applies to
price difference, not to economic price discrimination. See Rowe, Price Differentials and Prod-
uct Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 36-38 (1956).
87. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. at 549-50.
88. Assume, for example, that IBM sells computation machines to every buyer at a price
of $5000 and has a 10% rate of return. IBM also requires each purchaser to buy all its cards
from IBM. IBM sells the cards to all buyers at a price of 10 each, which gives it a 50% rate of
return on the cards. IBM's net rate of return on the package is much higher from the purchaser
that uses 1,000,000 cards per year than from the buyer that consumes 10,000 cards per year.
IBM has not violated the Robinson-Patman Act, however, because it is selling the machine to
every purchaser for $5000 and the cards to every buyer at 10t each.
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single bolt with a single nut, and replace the tying product and the
tied product at the same time. In a variable proportion tie-in, on the
other hand, consumers use varying amounts of the tied product with
the tying product. The tying arrangement at issue in IBM v. United
States9 provides a good example of a variable proportion tie-in: con-
sumers that use the same quantity of the tying product-computa-
tion machines-purchase widely varying amounts of the tied
product-cards.
Fixed proportion tying arrangements generally are unlikely can-
didates for use as metering devices. A tying arrangement can func-
tion as a metering device when the consumer's use of a certain prod-
uct is measurable by the amount of a particular ingredient that the
product requires. This kind of measurement requires a variable pro-
portion tying arrangement. Fixed proportion tying arrangements can
facilitate price discrimination, although sellers can approximate per-
fect price discrimination more closely with a variable proportion ty-
ing arrangement. The "block-booking" arrangement may serve as a
fixed proportion price discrimination device by allowing a seller to
take advantage of the preferences of its customers. Block-booking is a
scheme in which a distributor of television motion pictures leases
films only in groups; if Casablanca and Gorilla Man are in the same
group, for example, then a television station cannot obtain one film
without also taking the other. As George J. Stigler and other econo-
mists have noted, block-booking can be a disguised form of price dis-
crimination because it permits the distributor of the films to take
into account the station's various preferences for films and to set
these preferences off against each other.90 -For example, assume that
station A is willing to pay $10,000 for Casablanca and $6000 for Go-
rilla Man. Station B, however, will pay $8000 for Gorilla Man but
only $7000 for Casablanca. If the distributor licenses the films sepa-
rately and cannot price discriminate, it will be able to license Casa-
blanca twice only at a price of $7000 and Gorilla Man twice only at a
price of $6000.91 This arrangement will give the distributor total reve-
nues of $26,000 from these two stations for the two films. By packag-
ing the films and selling the package for $15,000, however, the dis-
tributor can sell both films to both stations and generate revenues of
$30,000. Station A is willing to pay $16,000 for the combination and
89. 298 U.S. 131 (1936). See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
90. See generally Stigler, supra note 81. For a more elaborate version of this theory, see
R. BORK, supra note 10, at 378; Markovits, supra note 7, at 1454-58.
91. The distributor can also license the films once each at prices of $10,000 and $8000 and
generate total revenues of $18,000.
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station B is willing to purchase the package for $15,000.
Few fixed proportion package sales likely serve as price discrimi-
nation devices. Unless a particular seller's customers are divisible
into two fairly homogenous groups with dissimilar preferences, the
seller probably would not be able to construct a "package" that
would account for its customers' wide variety of preferences.92 For
example, in United States v. Loew's, Inc.9" each defendant made five
or more sales and the blocks of films were in packages of as many as
26 films, 52 films, or, in one instance, 754 films.94 As the number of
customers and films in a block increases, evaluating each customer's
individual film preferences and determining a profit-maximizing
price for the block of films that will generate more revenue than
would individual licensing becomes increasingly difficult and un-
likely.9 5 Defendants in Loew's, which were competing distributors, 6
92. Professor Markovits describes the most likely instance in which this form of price
discrimination may occur. Suppose that a manufacturer of a household product, for example,
dish detergent that has a widely recognized brand name, believes that it has two classes of
purchasers: High demand purchasers that will buy the name even at a price which is well above
cost and exceeds the price of less well known brands, and low demand buyers that will purchase
the product only if it has an attractive price. The manufacturer, therefore, places in each box of
the product a coupon offering a different product, such as a set of inexpensive dishes, at a low
price. The high demand purchasers, which are presumably wealthier, will buy the product at a
supracompetitive price, but will throw the coupon away because they would never buy the
cheap dishes. The low demand purchasers, which are presumably less wealthy, will buy the
household product at the higher price because of the cost savings they can obtain by using the
coupon to purchase the dishes. Markovits, supra note 5, at 1407.
Although the courts have not identified blanket licensing agreements as price discrimina-
tion devices, blanket licensing apparently enables licensors to price discriminate by taking ad-
vantage of the different preferences of radio stations. Some stations place a high value on coun-
try and western music, others on classical, rock, or other types of music. In a blanket license
agreement the licensee pays one price for the right to play all the music in the licensor's inven-
tory. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently con-
demned a blanket licensing practice, but it apparently based its decision on the leverage theory.
The court found that the "selling power of one [copyrighted composition] adds to that of the
others and the monopoly of all is enlarged." Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Soc'y of
Composers, 546 F. Supp. 274, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), aff'd on remand, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 970 (1981).
93. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
94. See id. at 41-42.
95. In a much simpler factual context the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that a seller
could use a fixed proportion tie-in as a price discrimination device. See Hirsh v. Martindale-
Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982). The tie-in
in that case, however, could have been price discriminatory. Defendant, which publishes a di-
rectory of American attorneys, requires each attorney who advertises in the directory to
purchase at least one copy himself. Some attorneys may place a very high value on having their
name in the directory since they will then be known to other lawyers. Other lawyers may place
a higher value on having a copy of the directory, so that they can locate attorneys elsewhere.
Under these circumstances, defendant could have used the tie-in to achieve price discrimina-
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probably used block-booking arrangements not for price discrimina-
tion purposes but to lower transaction costs.9 7
Variable proportion tying arrangements, on the other hand, are
inherently conducive to both metering and price discrimination. Sup-
pose, for example, that the lessor of a copying machine requires that
the lessee purchase its copy paper and ink from the lessor as a condi-
tion of obtaining the machine. 8 The lessee's consumption of the pa-
per and ink will serve as a reasonably good measure of the lessee's
use of the machine. This measurement may serve the lessor in two
ways. First, the lessor's maintenance and depreciation costs may vary
according to the intensity with which the lessee uses the machine. By
renting all machines at the same basic rate and then charging a
higher than competitive price for the paper and ink, the lessor may
obtain from high intensity users of the machine additional revenue
that will approximate the additional service requirements and loss in
resale value that the lessor inevitably will incur. If this revenue dif-
ferential precisely offsets the cost differential between more intense
and less intense users, the lessor's tying arrangement is not economic
price discrimination. The lessor does not receive a higher rate of re-
turn from the high intensity users but merely recovers the higher cost
that high intensity use imposes. The tying arrangement, therefore,
serves as a metering device to measure costs.
Sellers also can use variable proportion tying arrangements to ef-
fect price discrimination. For example, suppose that the lessor of a
copying machine has reason to believe that high intensity users of its
machine value the machine more highly than do lower intensity
users. In other words, someone who makes 10,000 copies per year
would pay more for a machine than someone who makes only 500
copies per year. The 500 copy user, however, would be willing to pay
the actual cost of providing the machine and would negotiate a lease
profitable to the lessor. If the lessor had market power in the copy
machine market and could not practice price discrimination, the les-
sor might set a profit-maximizing price higher than the 500 copy user
would pay, even though the 500 copy user would willingly pay the
cost price.
tion among attorneys that ascribe different values to the two products.
96. Loew's was a consolidation of actions against six film distributors. The United States
did not allege that any combination or conspiracy existed among them. 371 U.S. at 40.
97. The distributors could license the films in blocks more cheaply than they could nego-
tiate individually with each station for performance rights to each film. Cf. Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
98. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
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Ideally, the lessor would like to engage in perfect price discrimi-
nation. If the value that each lessee places on the machine varies di-
rectly with the number of copies which each one makes,99 then the
lessor of the machine could approach perfect price discrimination by
"giving" the machine to each lessee but charging a supracompetitive
price for the paper and ink. The lessor would calculate its profits in
the paper and ink to match the amount that each lessee values the
machine. Under this near-perfect scheme of price discrimination each
lessee would spend the full amount that it is willing to pay for use of
the machine, and the seller would pocket the entire consumer sur-
plus.100 Furthermore, every user that was willing to pay a price equal
to or above marginal cost could obtain a machine. Consequently,
even though the seller has market power, output would be the same
as in a competitive market.
No seller could engage in perfect price discrimination because
purchasers of a machine simply do not value the machine in direct
proportion to their intensity of use. For example, high volume users
might place a lower per unit value on the machine than low volume
users since alternatives, such as taking their copying to a third party
firm, might be available at a lower price to the high volume users.
Nevertheless, as a general rule, high volume users place a greater
value on the machine than do lower volume users. Therefore, a seller
can use a tying arrangement in certain situations to increase its prof-
its above the amount it could earn in a market completely free of
price discrimination.
2. Price Discrimination, Variable Proportion Tie-ins, and Class
Actions
Suppose that a seller of a copying machine creates a variable
proportion tying arrangement solely to facilitate price discrimination.
The cost to the seller of providing the machine is the same regardless
whether the use is light or heavy. The seller employs the tying ar-
rangement plus supracompetitive profits in the tied product to earn a
higher rate of return from high intensity users of the tying product.
The "victims" of the seller's tying arrangement-the seller's custom-
ers-initiate a class action.
The court first must determine the identity of those customers
99. For example, a 1000 copy-per-year user values the machine twice as much as a 500
copy-per-year user, and a 2000 copy-per-year user attaches twice as much worth to its machine
as a 1000 copy-per-year user.
100. See infra note 101.
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whom the tying arrangement injures. Obviously, high intensity users
suffer the greatest harm, because the seller is obtaining the highest
rate of return from them, and if the seller were not engaging in the
tying arrangement they probably could obtain the machine and sup-
plies at a lower aggregate price. Some low intensity users actually
benefit from the tie-in because the price discrimination scheme en-
ables them to obtain the machine. For example, assume that the cost
of providing the machine is $500 per year. Furthermore, the seller of
the machine has monopoly power and determines that if it sells or
leases machines to all customers for the same amount, its profit-max-
imizing price will be $800 per year. Certain high volume users of the
machine, however, are willing to pay more than $800 per year, and
the highest intensity user is willing to pay $1500. If the seller were
able to use a tying arrangement to create perfect price discrimina-
tion, it would make a sale to every buyer that values the machine at
its cost price or higher because each of these sales would be profita-
ble. The sale price would be the maximum amount over $500 that the
purchaser is willing to pay. If the seller were not able to price dis-
criminate, it would not make sales to these potential purchasers that
value the machine at more than $500 but less than $800 per year.
These buyers are unwilling to purchase the machine at its nondis-
criminatory profit-maximizing price. In short, this particular class of
purchasers actually benefits from the tie-in because the scheme en-
ables them to purchase the defendant's product. The class that the
defendant's tying arrangement injures consists of those buyers that
would have paid the defendant's profit-maximizing price in a nondis-
criminatory market, but must pay more in the price discriminatory
market.10'
Although variations in the amount of damages that each puta-
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Figure 1 illustrates this analysis. The figure shows the demand curve of a seller with mar-
ket power, with marginal cost (MC) and marginal revenue (MR) curves. The competitive price,
P(c), is the point at which the demand curve and the seller's marginal cost curve intersect. At
that point, further expansion of output by the seller would cause losses, for the seller could sell
its products only at a price less than the marginal cost of production. The nondiscriminatory
profit-maximizing price, P(m), is located where the marginal cost (MC) and marginal revenue
(MR) curves intersect. A seller in the position illustrated by the graph would maximize its
profits by pricing its output at P(m) if it were not able to price discriminate. With the product
at that price, all buyers located along the demand curve between points 4 and 6 (those buyers
willing to pay more than P(c) but less than P(m)) would substitute a different product.
In a perfectly price discriminatory market, however, as in a perfectly competitive market,
every sale at a price greater than the marginal cost of producing the extra output is profitable.
If the seller is able to engage in perfect price discrimination, it will make every sale to every
purchaser along the demand curve at the maximum price that the buyer is willing to pay for
the product. The seller thus can transfer to itself an amount equal to the area of triangle 1-2-4,
which otherwise would be consumer surplus, and an amount equal to triangle 4-5-6, which,
after some adjustments, otherwise would be deadweight loss. See R. POSNER, supra note 54, at
12-14. The figure also illustrates the consequences for the buyers if the seller is able to engage
in perfect price discrimination. All buyers located along the demand curve between points 4
and 6 (those buyers that are willing to pay more than P(c) but are not willing to pay P(m)) will
benefit from the seller's price discrimination scheme. In a nondiscriminatory market in which
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tive class member suffers will not defeat class certification,102 class
action plaintiffs must establish the fact of injury by common proof
for all members of the proferred class. 03 Consistent with this re-
quirement, if the sole purpose of the defendant's tying arrangement
is price discrimination, the court must determine what the defen-
dant's profit-maximizing price would be in a nondiscriminatory mar-
ket. Only in this way can the court identify which purchasers the
price discrimination scheme injured. The court then should limit
class certification to the purchasers that are paying more than the
defendant's nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price as a result of
the price discrimination scheme.0 4
Ignoring this distinction, courts frequently have certified classes
consisting of all plaintiff purchasers in cases in which the purpose of
the defendant's tying arrangement was to meter or price discrimi-
nate. The leading example of this situation is Siegel v. Chicken De-
light, Inc.105 The Seigel facts allow only two reasonable explanations
the seller charged P(m), these buyers would have suffered foreclosure from the seller's market.
On the other hand, the price discrimination scheme injures all buyers along the demand curve
above point 4. They could have purchased at price P(m) in a nondiscriminatory market; yet
because of the price discrimination scheme they either must pay a price greater than P(m) or
must substitute away. If the tie-in price discrimination scheme did not result in any increased
output above the nondiscriminatory monopolistic output, the set of customers located between
points 4 and 6 would be empty. See supra note 82. When a tie-in facilitates price discrimina-
tion, however, good reason exists to believe that the discrimination results in a larger output
than nondiscriminatory monopoly pricing would, particularly if the price of the tying product is
zero, as it was in Chicken Delight. See infra notes 105-14.
102. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
103. See authorities cited supra note 13.
104. Limiting the class to those buyers that paid more than the defendant's profit-maxi-
mizing price is no easy task. It may require the court to decide some of the merits of the claim
while determining whether certification is appropriate. To identify the class of purchasers, the
court will have to establish the profit-maximizing price and, in doing so, determine at least one
of the substantive elements of a tying arrangement: the defendant's market power in the tying
product. The court also necessarily will discover whether anticompetitive effects exist in the
market for the tied product-that is, whether a group of buyers paid more for the tied product
than they would have paid in the absence of the tying arrangement. Computation of the defen-
dant's profit-maximizing price in a nondiscriminatory market requires information about the
defendant's marginal cost and the elasticity of demand facing the defendant. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 84, at 940. Alternatively, knowledge of the defendant's market share, the
market elasticity of demand, and the competing firms' elasticity of supply, permits a determi-
nation of the defendant's market power. Id. at 944. In all cases, however, identification of the
defendant's profit-maximizing price will require the court to engage in factfinding substantially
in excess of that normally undertaken to determine whether class certification is appropriate.
The only alternatives that a court has to deciding the merits of a case seem to be refusal of
class action certification when the defendant clearly is using a tying arrangement for price dis-
crimination, or modification of the well-established doctrine that all members of a class must
show fact of injury by common proof.
105. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
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for the tying arrangement at issue. First, the tying arrangement cre-
ated efficiency by permitting Chicken Delight to monitor the quality
of the product that its franchisees delivered. 10 6 Second, the tie-in per-
mitted Chicken Delight to meter the sales of its franchisees or obtain
a higher rate of return from high volume outlets than from low vol-
ume outlets. Perhaps both of these explanations have some
validity.10 7
The tying product in the Chicken Delight litigation was
franchisor-defendant's name, trademark, and method of doing busi-
ness, all of which franchisor licensed to franchisees. The tied product
was various cooking machinery and certain batter mixes and packag-
ing materials. Defendant provided franchisees with the tying product
at no charge, but it required franchisees to purchase from it the tied
products at a price substantially above the prevailing market rate.105
Defendant did not manufacture any of the tied products; rather it
bought them on the open market and resold them to franchisees. 109
Defendant argued that this arrangement was "[a] convenient ac-
counting device for compensation of the trademark license ... ."1
The district court ruled that the accounting explanation did not jus-
tify "so onerous an anti-competitive device as the tie-in agreement
herein condemned." 11 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that defendant probably used the tie-in
to measure and charge franchisees according to sales volume but re-
plied that "feasible alternative methods of compensation for the
franchise licenses [exist], including royalties based on sales volume
... .,, The Ninth Circuit failed to explain why this mechanism
was any less anticompetitive than or different from Chicken Delight's
device. Presumably, franchisor lawfully could allow franchisees to
enter the market themselves to buy packages of mix, and then charge
them 25t for each package they purchased. When Chicken Delight
106. For examples of this kind of tying arrangement, see Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671
F.2d 1282 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 127 (1982); Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631
F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
107. The functions of metering and price discrimination need not be mutually exclusive.
Costs to a lessor or licensor may vary with the licensee's intensity of use, and the variable rate
that the licensees pay may exceed the variation in costs. To the extent that the licensee's higher
charges exceed the higher costs which the licensor incurred, the charges are price
discriminatory.
108. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d at 46-47.
109. Id. at 48 n.4.
110. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847, 850 (N.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 448
F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
111. 311 F. Supp. at 850.
112. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d at 50.
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bought the package itself and added 25t to an ordinary markup,
however, the measuring device became an antitrust violation. Plain-
tiffs never argued that defendant had anything approaching a mo-
nopoly in the materials, such as flour, batter, paper products, or
cookers and fryers, that constituted the tied product. Furthermore,
since Chicken Delight itself purchased these items, the scheme did
not "foreclose" any competitor in the tied product market. For exam-
ple, plaintiffs made no allegations that Chicken Delight had an exclu-
sive dealing contract with any supplier of the tied products. Chicken
Delight's arrangement permitted it to enter the market once for each
product and cover the needs of its 650 franchisees, presumably at
significant transaction cost savings. Perhaps more importantly, since
Chicken Delight bought the batters, mixes, and equipment itself, it
could assure uniformity and consistency of quality in the product
sold by its franchisees. Chicken Delight's tie-in, therefore, was proba-
bly efficiency creating.
The class that the court certified consisted of "all 'Chicken De-
light' franchisees in the United States." 113 Since no evidence existed
that the cost of providing the tying product to a particular franchisee
varied with the volume of that franchisee's sales, defendant undoubt-
edly was engaging in price discrimination. It received a higher net
rate of return from high volume franchisees than from lower volume
franchisees. As a result, many plaintiffs certified in the class were
beneficiaries rather than victims of defendant's tying arrangement. If
Chicken Delight had not price discriminated, it would have charged
its profit-maximizing price, and many low volume franchisees would
not have had a franchise at all. 1 4
When a tying arrangement-particularly a variable proportion
tie-int'1 5-apparently serves to facilitate price discrimination, courts
must look more carefully at class certification requests than they
have in the past. If the case is to proceed as a class action, the court
either must establish the defendant's nondiscriminatory profit-maxi-
113. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 725 (N.D. Cal. 1967), mandamus
granted, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969), enforced, 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), modified,
448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
114. Furthermore, although the Ninth Circuit suggested that Chicken Delight could have
engaged in price discrimination by another mechanism, such as royalties based on sales volume,
448 F.2d at 50, the district court declined to permit defendant to offset franchisees' damages by
the value of the license (the tying product). Consequently, plaintiffs potentially could recover
treble damages for the only fees they paid to Chicken Delight since Chicken Delight had pro-
vided the license without charge and collected its fees exclusively through sales of the tied
product. 311 F. Supp. at 852. The Ninth Circuit declined to modify this ruling. 448 F.2d at 53.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
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mizing price before certification, or it must relax the rule that re-
quires all members seeking class certification to show fact of injury
by common proof. The first alternative is probably unrealistic if
courts are to maintain any distinction between certification proceed-
ings and deciding the case on the merits. Determining the defen-
dant's profit-maximizing price in a nondiscriminatory market would
require little less than a full trial of virtually all the important eco-
nomic issues at stake in a tie-in case. The second solution-relaxing
the requirement that all rule 23(b)(3) class members be able to show
fact of injury by common proof-is inconsistent with the case law
and may conflict with rule 23 itself.1 ' Therefore, courts should not
certify tying arrangement class actions when the tie-in serves as a
price discrimination device.
Failure to certify a class action in a franchise tie-in case ordina-
rily could force dozens or even hundreds of similar individual actions
into the federal court system.117 Plaintiffs in the Chicken Delight
class action, for example, numbered more than 650."1 Fortunately,
the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore"19 greatly mitigated the consequences of refusal to certify a
franchisee class action by permitting offensive nonmutual collateral
estoppel in appropriate circumstances. If a case meets the Parklane
116. See cases cited supra note 13.
117. The franchise tie-in cases typically consist of franchisees as the plaintiffs and a
franchisor as the defendant. The franchisees claim that the defendant-franchisor required them
to take some product necessary to their business but obtainable from competing suppliers at a
lower price. In the class action cases the franchisees seeking certification usually have identical
or nearly identical arrangements with the franchisor. Although the courts seldom discuss the
possibility that the franchisor is using the tying arrangement to price discriminate, the infer-
ence is commonly present. See, e.g., Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 127 (1982) (tied product a lease of franchisee's retail location; rent varied
with gross sales); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982) (tied
product ice cream sold by the individual franchisees); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d
43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (tied products expressly used to effect price
discrimination scheme). For a discussion of similar cases, see Harkins, Tying and the Fran-
chisee, 47 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 903 (1978); Hensley, Franchise Tying: Gauging the Economic
Power of a Trademark, 15 U.C.D. L. REv. 405 (1981); Kahn, The Importance of Franchisee
Class Actions, 47 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 915 (1978); Lipner, The Legality of Franchise Lease
Tying, 46 ALB. L. REv. 858 (1982); McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The
Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1085 (1970); Note, Trademark Franchising and Anti-
trust Law: The Two-Product Rule for Tying Arrangements, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 953 (1976);
Comment, A New Approach to the Legality of Franchising Tie-Ins, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1267
(1981).
118. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 725 (N.D. Cal. 1967), mandamus
granted, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969), enforced, 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), modified,
448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
119. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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Hosiery standard12 0 -as many franchisee antitrust cases do-a single
plaintiff-franchisee or a small group could litigate against the
franchisor, determine liability, and identify what the defendant's
profit-maximizing price would have been in a nondiscriminatory mar-
ket. With these issues established in an initial judgment, other fran-
chisees that, because of the illegal tying arrangement, paid more than
the defendant's nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price could
have the benefit of earlier fact findings and assert their own right to
damages. 12 1 This kind of "test case" approach, 122 with careful judicial
120. A subsequent plaintiff seeking to benefit from offensive collateral estoppel under the
Parklane test must show (1) that it could not easily have joined in the earlier litigation, 439
U.S. at 331; (2) that the defendant had every incentive to litigate "fully and vigorously" in the
first action, id. at 332; (3) that the judgment on which the court relies for collateral estoppel is
generally consistent with other judgments on the same operative facts, id. at 330; and (4) that
the second action does not afford the defendant procedural opportunities that were unavailable
in the first action and could cause a different result, id. at 331. The first element of the test
could pose a substantial problem for a subsequent franchisee-plaintiff. Judicial economy re-
quires that the plaintiff join in the initial litigation, rather than await the outcome of the first
lawsuit before filing itself. Allowing the plaintiff to wait would effectively give it two bites at
the apple. Whether the plaintiff could have joined in the earlier litigation-particularly in the
franchise tie-in cases-largely depends on the number of named plaintiffs a court is willing to
accommodate in an action and the court's evaluation of the plaintiff's status as a "wait-and-
see" plaintiff that attempts to take advantage of the earlier judgment if it is favorable and
avoid it if it is unfavorable. Id. If a court finds that judicial economy permits offensive assertion
of collateral estoppel, and if the defendant was in a position to understand the consequences of
litigating the first case, then the court may permit offensive collateral estoppel even though the
plaintiff actually could have joined in the earlier litigation. See Carr v. District of Columbia,
646 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); GAF
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); W.J. Roberts & Co. v. S.S.
Hellenic Glory, 471 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). For a general discussion of the uses and
limitations of nonmutual, offensive collateral estoppel, see 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MLR & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4464-4465 (1981). For an extended argument
that offensive collateral estoppel is both inefficient and unjust, see Flanagan, Offensive Collat-
eral Estoppel: Inefficiency and Foolish Consistency, 1982 ARmz. ST. L.J. 45.
121. This analysis makes no effort to distinguish between a tying arrangement used as a
nondiscriminatory metering device and a tie-in that serves to promote price discrimination. In
virtually all franchisee class action tying arrangement cases, see supra note 117, the inference is
appropriate that price discrimination, and not nondiscriminatory metering, is occurring. Gener-
ally, no evidence exists that the defendant's costs varied with the sales volume of each
franchise; instead the franchisor used the tying arrangement to obtain a higher rate of return
from more profitable franchisees. The price discrimination scheme injured each franchisee by-
an amount equal to the difference between the price the franchisee actually paid for the tying
product (generally the license to use the trademark or trademarks, certain methods of doing
business, advertising, and similar benefits) and the profit-maximizing price of the tying product
in a nondiscriminatory market. For example, suppose that the nondiscriminatory profit-maxi-
mizing price of an ice cream franchisor's license is $100,000 per year. Suppose that the
franchisor sells the license to all franchisees at $50,000 but requires each franchisee to purchase
all its ice cream from the franchisor at a price $1 higher per gallon than the ice cream's market
price. A high volume franchisee that sells 100,000 gallons of ice cream during a particular year
would pay $50,000 for the franchise and $100,000 excess profits on the ice cream--or $150,000.
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use of collateral estoppel, seems more consistent with current case
law and better suited to the problem of overbroad classes than does a
class action. This method could become a valuable alternative to
class actions in price discrimination tying arrangement cases.
E. Tying Arrangements that Create Efficiency
As the grocery store illustrations discussed in part I suggest, 23
sellers and manufacturers create many tying arrangements simply be-
cause the most efficient way to deliver products to consumers is in
packages. When a soup company decides to manufacture canned veg-
etable soup it makes an initial determination about the ingredients
for the soup and requires all customers to take everything in the
can-carrots, celery, potatoes, and even turnips. If every customer
had a legal right to buy a vegetable soup that contained precisely the
ingredients desired by the customer, the marketing and production of
soup would be inefficient and the soup extremely expensive.
While sales of vegetable soup in cans with predetermined, uni-
form contents clearly enhance net consumer welfare, the requirement
does not increase the welfare of every consumer. Consumers that pre-
fer their vegetable soup without the turnips must purchase the tur-
nips anyway and then go through the time-consuming and inefficient
process of removing them. The only available market alternative for
The price discrimination scheme injures that franchisee in the amount of $50,000. On the other
hand, a low volume franchisee that sells only 40,000 gallons of ice cream during the year pays
only $90,000. The latter franchisee actually has benefited from the existence of the tying ar-
rangement. In a nondiscriminatory market it either would have paid $100,000 for the license, or
it would have opted not to take the franchise. The court should dismiss the claim of this partic-
ular franchisee.
122. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974). Several antitrust opinions have suggested that when a class action is unsuitable because
of the failure of common question predominance, a "test case" would be an appropriate alter-
native. One plaintiff or a small group of plaintiffs that could establish most issues for the larger
class of potential claimants could sue the defendant and determine liability. Subsequent plain-
tiffs could then use offensive collateral estoppel for the issues established earlier and prove
additional issues as necessary for their own recovery. Such a procedure contains one potential
source of unfairness to defendants. Whereas adverse rulings will be binding on the defendant in
subsequent proceedings, findings favorable to the defendant will not bind future plaintiffs. In
general, adverse findings made in a litigation do not bind nonparties to that action. See
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Hans-
berry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). Nevertheless, some courts have advocated the "test case"
approach as a mechanism to accomplish the "same result" as a class action "without involving
the court in a morass of individual claims that will bog the court system down interminably."
Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 69 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968
(1978); see Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 290 (3d Cir. 1978); Kypta
v. McDonald's Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,106 (1978).
123. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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these buyers is either to forego canned vegetable soup, or to find a
competitor that manufactures a canned vegetable soup more suitable
to their tastes.
Many tying arrangements fall within this category: they create
efficiency but injure certain customers in the process."" A shoe
store's requirement that purchasers buy shoes only in pairs substan-
tially reduces inventory and handling costs that the store would incur
if it offered solitary left and right shoes. Hence, the shoe store can
offer pairs of shoes at a lower price. The requirement, however, nec-
essarily injures consumers that would prefer to purchase a solitary
left or right shoe. Similarly, a newspaper's requirement that purchas-
ers of advertising place their advertisements in both morning and
evening editions enables the newspaper to take orders, bill clients,
and, more importantly, set type a single time.12 5 As a result, the
newspaper can produce advertising at a much lower rate. To create
the savings, the newspaper must force all advertisers to purchase
both morning and evening advertising simultaneously, so that it can
publish identical morning and evening classified sections. While the
newspaper's customers and most of its advertisers benefit from the
requirement,126 certain advertisers suffer a detriment because they
prefer to advertise in only one of the two editions but must buy ad-
vertising in both.
Similarly, in the area of franchising, the "package" of goods and
services the franchisor offers often creates efficiency but harms par-
124. Obviously, the kind of "efficiency" that the canned soup tying arrangement creates is
not Pareto efficiency. One situation, A, is Pareto superior to a different situation B, if the
change from B to A benefits at least one person and harms no one. A world in which producers
standardize canned vegetable soup and sell it to everyone on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is not
Pareto superior to a world in which the law gives each purchaser the right to buy a can of
vegetable soup with precisely the desired ingredients, because some consumers would be worse
off in the former world. Those purchasers that would prefer not to have the turnips would be
better off in the world that gives each buyer the right to choose its own ingredients. "Efficient"
in the canned soup illustration describes the standard of "potential" Pareto superiority or
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A situation A is Kaldor-Hicks superior to a situation B if the benefi-
ciaries of the move from B to A gain enough to compensate fully the losers from the proceeds
from their gains, even though the compensation does not actually take place. Unlike the Pareto
efficiency test, the Kaldor-Hicks test permits a netting out of gains and losses and an evalua-
tion of a move as "efficient" if the aggregate gains are greater than the aggregate losses. In
general, "efficient" antitrust policy means Kaldor-Hicks, not Pareto, efficiency. See R. POSNER,
THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 90-92 (1981); Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximiza-
tion, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509 (1980); Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency
in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591 (1980).
125. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 623 (1953).
126. Since the tying arrangement reduces the cost of advertising, the newspaper will be
able to print more ads, and presumably customers will be better off. Id. at 623 n.45.
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ticular franchisees. 127 Franchises like McDonald's are successful be-
cause of their reputation for quality and uniformity. A New Yorker
driving through Illinois knows that the McDonald's there will be very
similar to the McDonald's at home. A nationwide or statewide
franchisor succeeds precisely because its franchisees operate busi-
nesses that are nearly identical to one another. The chief value of the
nationwide franchise lies in its goodwill: customers that recognize the
name know what they are buying, even though they may never have
entered a particular franchisee's store before. To the extent that the
franchisor and customers benefit because of this enforced uniformity,
the franchisees themselves gain an advantage. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently noted in Principe v.
McDonald's Corp.:128
[McDonald's Corporation's] regime pervades all facets of the business, from the
design of the menu board to the amount of catsup on the hamburgers, nothing is
left to chance. This pervasive franchisor supervision and control benefits the
franchisee in turn. His business is identified with a network of stores whose very
uniformity and predictability attracts customers. In short, the modern fran-
chisee pays not only for the right to use a trademark but for the right to become
a part of a system whose business methods virtually guarantee his success." '
In Principe the Fourth Circuit applied the "separate products"
test to find that the alleged tying arrangement which McDonald's im-
posed upon its franchisees was lawful."" The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded for a number of reasons that the "package" of goods and ser-
vices was actually a single product. First, the court found that
because of its expertise and experience, McDonald's was in a much
better position than its franchisees, most of whom lacked experience,
to select new restaurant locations and arrange construction.' 3' Sec-
ond, the court concluded that McDonald's policy of owning its stores
and leasing them to franchisees benefited both the franchisor and the
franchisees in the aggregate, even though it might injure some indi-
vidual franchisees. The policy assured that stores would remain
within the McDonald's system even though a particular franchisee
might retire, die, or go out of business for another reason. The court
concluded that a substantial part of McDonald's goodwill existed be-
127. The "package" substitutes for full vertical integration, in which the franchisor owns
outright all its outlets. For the economics of franchising as an alternative to full vertical inte-
gration by the franchisor, see McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble
with Tie-ins, 58 CALF. L. REv. 1085 (1970); Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure
of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1978).
128. 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
129. 631 F.2d at 309.
130. Id. at 307-11; see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
131. 631 F.2d at 310.
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cause McDonald's locations had been around for a long time, many
sites had become far more valuable than their original cost, and few
buildings that displayed the identifiable McDonald's style were cur-
rently being used for other purposes.132 Third, the Fourth Circuit
found that by selecting franchise locations and building the stores
itself, McDonald's was able to choose franchisees based on their po-
tential for success rather than on their wealth or ability to offer a
suitable site. The court stated, "McDonald's policy of owning its own
stores reduces a franchisee's initial investment,. . . [which broadens]
the applicant base and opens the door to persons who Otherwise
could not afford a McDonald's franchise."' I3 Indeed, the record in
Principe established that petitioner himself would have been unable
to obtain the financing to build his location when he first became a
franchisee some ten years earlier.134 Notably, the disputes in both
Principe v. McDonald's Corp. and Kypta v. McDonald's Corp.3 5 be-
gan not when the named plaintiffs discovered the economic harm
that the McDonald's Corporation's franchise-lease tie-in was causing
them, but when they applied to McDonald's for a second or third
franchise location and the franchisor denied their request for lack of
sufficient administrative experience. 36 Last, the Fourth Circuit ob-
served that the McDonald's Corporation's system of tie-ins was really
a form of coinvestment that gave the franchisor and franchisees
strong financial incentives to make the new location successful.13 7 For
example, under the arrangement both the franchisor and the fran-
chisee invested a large amount of money in the new store.
As the Principe decision demonstrates, efficiency-creating tying
arrangements can produce both losers and winners. Although Mc-
Donald's mandatory assignment of restaurant sites benefits the cor-
poration, its customers, and many of its franchisees, the tying ar-
rangement might disadvantage certain franchisees that can afford
their own locations.
Many antitrust commentators argue that tying arrangements
which create efficiency should not be illegal under the antitrust
laws.138 Occasionally courts have agreed by holding, for example, that
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 310 n.8.
135. 671 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 127 (1982).
136. See Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d at 1283; Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631
F.2d at 304. This fact itself suggests that efficiency-creating tying arrangements are not suitable
for class action proceedings. See infra text accompanying notes 147-48.
137. Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d at 310-11.
138. See R. BORK, supra note 10, at 363-81; R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 171-84; Bow-
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the tying and tied items in a particular case were a single legal "prod-
uct."1 9 If a court can determine before certification that a particular
arrangement is efficiency creating and, hence, legal, then class action
proceedings pose no problem because the class plaintiffs will have no
claim anyway. Unfortunately, most existing law of tying arrange-
ments is not so straightforward. Only a very limited "efficiency" de-
fense exists in tie-in cases. Many tying arrangements that create effi-
ciency are illegal under current law.140 Courts that condemn
efficiency-creating tie-ins tend to blur the distinction between tying
arrangements which create efficiency and tie-ins that allegedly create
leverage by turning a single monopoly into two monopolies. Very few
courts have condemned a tie-in that they expressly have acknowl-
edged as efficiency creating. Rather, courts have based a finding of
illegality on either the leverage theory or, more commonly, on an un-
specified theory.""
Before certifying a class in a tying arrangement antitrust case, a
court should understand the economic function of the tying arrange-
ment in the defendant's distribution scheme. Otherwise, the court
lacks a mechanism for determining which potential plaintiffs have
suffered injury from the tying arrangement. If a court determines
that price discrimination, predatory pricing, or evasion of price regu-
man, supra note 11.
139. See cases cited supra note 13.
140. See, e.g., Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (Mar. 7, 1983 U.S.). The Fifth Circuit in Hyde held that a
tying arrangement which was really an exclusive dealing contract between a hospital and a
provider of anesthesiological services was illegal per se. Plaintiff was a competitor in the market
for the tied product, anesthesiological services. The court found that since plaintiff had made
out the requisite case for a per se tying arrangement under Fifth Circuit doctrine, the applica-
tion of the per se rule prevented the court from considering defendant's justifications. The
court, therefore, refused to consider defendant's arguments that integration of anesthesological
services through a single provider helped to reduce the hospital's costs and also enabled the
hospital to deliver better service, because the available anesthesiologist was familiar with the
hospital and its equipment. Id. at 293-94. Continued judicial recognition of a "per se" rule for
tying arrangements suggests that many courts still doubt that tying arrangements frequently
create efficiency.
141. The three, four, and five part tests that the courts have developed for determining
the legality of tying arrangements, see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text, generally
permit a court to judge the legality of a tie-in without actually considering the economic func-
tion that the tying arrangement is playing in the defendant's distribution scheme. As a result,
courts commonly condemn tying arrangements without any discussion of the tie-in's functional
use. Judges only recently have begun to consider the economic function of the tying arrange-
ment and to employ that functional analysis in their determination of legality. See Hirsh v.
Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982); Moore v.
Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM,
448 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The Ninth Circuit has led in this development.
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lation are implausible explanations for a particular tying arrange-
ment, then two possibilities remain: The leverage theory or the crea-
tion of efficiency. A court that accepts the leverage theory can infer
that the tying arrangement injured all purchasers similarly: by a mo-
nopoly overcharge. On the other hand, a court might refuse to adopt
the leverage theory and might acknowledge that a particular tying
arrangement creates efficiency, but nevertheless recognize the possi-
bility of liability. A court might choose the latter course either be-
cause it considers itself bound by current case law,142 which con-
demns efficiency-creating tying arrangements, or because it believes
that the antitrust laws embody goals other than allocative
efficiency. 143
Class certification analysis should acknowledge that efficiency-
creating tie-ins, like virtually all efficient practices, create both bene-
ficiaries and victims.14 4 Most of McDonald's Corporation's franchis-
ees and perhaps all its customers benefit because McDonald's re-
quires every franchisee to sell Coca-Cola as its soft drink and to lease
its retail outlet from the franchisor. Nevertheless, an occasional fran-
chisee, because of its particular position, would have greater success
if it did not have to follow the franchisor's requirements. 45 Similarly,
in the newspaper advertising illustration, most of the advertisers
probably benefit because of the newspaper's requirement that adver-
tisers place the same advertisement in both the morning and evening
editions. 14  The arrangement makes advertising substantially
142. For example, some courts that recognize a per se rule of illegality for tying arrange-
ments hold that in per se cases they may not consider the defendant's proferred efficiency
defenses. See Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286, 294 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (Mar. 7, 1983 U.S.). Other circuits will consider "business justi-
fication" defenses, including efficiency, even in per se analysis. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of
New England, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 1282, 1290-92 (D.N.H. 1982). See also Baker, The Supreme
Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REV. 1235 (1980).
143. See supra note 124; see also Hovenkainp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust
Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. - (1982) (forthcoming).
144. Even if the court uses the per se rule to determine liability, each plaintiff class mem-
ber must show fact of injury.
145. Principe v. McDonald's Corp. illustrates the problem of establishing fact of damage
by common proof, although that particular case was not a class action. Plaintiff in Principe was
attempting to show an illegal tying arrangement in McDonald's Corporation's requirement that
it provide the restaurant location for each franchisee. The record established, however, that at
the time plaintiff opened its first restaurant it did not have the financial resources to procure
its own location. Defendant's tying arrangement did not injure plaintiff, at least for that loca-
tion. Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d at 310 n.8; see Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671
F.2d 1282 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 127 (1982).
146. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); supra text ac-
companying note 125.
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cheaper. Nevertheless, a few advertisers probably prefer to advertise
in only the morning or evening newspaper.
Challenges to efficiency-creating tying arrangements are gener-
ally not suitable for class action certification when the plaintiffs are
customers of the defendant. First, since the arrangement creates effi-
ciency, the tie-in probably victimizes only a minority of the defen-
dant's purchasers. Second, the availability of treble damages may en-
courage many potential plaintiffs that actually benefit from the tying
arrangement to remain within the class. Whether a plaintiff is a ben-
eficiary or a victim of an efficiency-creating tying arrangement de-
pends largely on the particular party's unique circumstances-for ex-
ample, its own ability to obtain an equally good restaurant location
at a lower price 147 or its own lack of interest in combined morning
and evening advertising. Because a court cannot determine fact of
injury without examining the position of each plaintiff, class action
certification would be inappropriate. In this circumstance careful ju-
dicial use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel for issues that
really are common to all purchasers would be a better way to
proceed. 4"
If, on the other hand, the plaintiffs are the defendant's competi-
tors in the market for the tied product, the tying arrangement proba-
bly injures all plaintiffs in the same way, and class certification is
appropriate, provided that the court is willing to recognize liabil-
ity for efficiency-creating tie-ins. For example, even if a hospital's
practice of using its own anesthesiologists is efficient, that practice
uniformly will injure competing anesthesiologists who cannot have
access to the hospital's business.14 Efficient tie-ins, like all other effi-
ciency-creating practices, do not produce gainers and losers among
competitors-only losers.
IV. MULTIPURPOSE TYING ARRANGEMENTS
Sellers often create tying arrangements for more than one of the
economic reasons described in this Article. For example, McDonald's
undoubtedly created the franchise-lease tying arrangement for two
quite different economic purposes. First, as the court in Principe ex-
pressly found, defendant's requirement that it provide sites and
buildings to franchisees created efficiency. 50 Second, the rental fee
147. See supra note 145.
148. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
149. See Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (Mar. 7, 1983 U.S.).
150. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
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contained in the lease varied with the franchisee's gross revenues,
which indicates that McDonald's also was engaged in price discrimi-
nation.151 Similarly, in IBM 52 defendant probably tied paper punch
cards to its computing machines for two reasons. First, IBM may
have been trying to avoid excessive maintenance or user dissatisfac-
tion by ensuring that consumers used only cards of IBM design in
the machines. 153 If the tying arrangement was the cheapest way to
achieve this objective, the tying arrangement created efficiency. 5 4
Second, IBM almost certainly was engaged in price discrimination.
For the most part, when the creator of a tying arrangement uses
it for more than one purpose, courts must analyze separately the re-
sulting injury with respect to each purpose. For example, a tie-in that
facilitates price discrimination generally produces one set of gainers
and one set of losers. Gainers tend to be low volume users of the
defendant's products, and losers tend to be high volume users.
55 If
the seller uses the same tying arrangement to create efficiency, as
McDonald's did, a new set of gainers and losers emerges. The fran-
chisees in the McDonald's cases collectively benefited from the tie-in
because McDonald's could select applicants based on management
potential rather than economic resources and because restaurant lo-
cations were more permanent than franchisee-owned locations. These
results increased the value of McDonald's goodwill to the advantage
of both the franchisor and the franchisee. The enhanced goodwill in
turn contributed to consumer welfare. Nevertheless, the tie-in proba-
bly injured some individual franchisees, and their injuries may have
outweighed the goodwill gains they received because of the tie-in.
The franchisees harmed by McDonald's creation of efficiency, how-
ever, are not the same class as the franchisees injured in McDonald's
price discrimination scheme. A court must establish separately
whether a particular McDonald's franchisee is a loser as a result of
one or both of the tying arrangement's functions.' 56 Accordingly, a
151. See Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 970 (1981).
152. IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); see supra note 88 and accompanying
text.
153. IBM raised this claim as a defense. 298 U.S. at 134, 138-39.
154. The court in the IBM case found that IBM simply could have set standards, and no
evidence existed that competitors would fail to meet those standards. Id. at 139.
155. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
156. The price discrimination scheme would injure successful franchisees and benefit less
successful franchisees. See supra note 101. The requirement that McDonald's supply the loca-
tion for each franchisee, however, might advantage smaller franchisees and harm larger ones,
which sometimes would have more capital and be able to purchase their own stores. These
groups may or may not be the same.
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court should treat certification separately for each functional claim.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1949 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]ying agreements serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition. ' 157 The
Supreme Court was wrong. Many forced combined sales create effi-
ciencies in distribution or manufacturing or enable a seller to meter
its costs. A tying arrangement's illegality should depend on the eco-
nomic function of the tie-in in the defendant's distribution scheme.
Unfortunately, courts have developed a legal test for tie-ins that fails
to elucidate these economic functions. Most judicial economic analy-
sis of tie-ins in the case law exists despite, not because of, the ex-
isting test of legality. The economic function of a tying arrangement
is important not only in determining the tying arrangement's legality,
but also in establishing whom it injures. Different kinds of tie-ins
cause different kinds of injuries. Some tying arrangements produce
almost nothing but losers. A majority, however, produce both gainers
and losers, and any rule that permits a tie-in antitrust case to pro-
ceed as a class action must include a mechanism for distinguishing
one group from the other.
The "leverage" theory-that the owner of a monopoly in one
product can use a tie-in to create a second monopoly and enlarge its
monopoly profits-reasonably permits the inference that all custom-
ers of the tie-in suffer a common injury. Under the leverage theory all
customers are victims of a monopoly overcharge. Unfortunately, how-
ever, economists have discredited thoroughly the leverage theory, as
courts are beginning to recognize. Nevertheless, if a court is willing to
accept the leverage theory as a substantive description of a particular
tying arrangement, the court should allow class certification in that
case.
Tying arrangements that serve to evade statutory price regula-
tion are generally suitable for class action proceedings. When a seller
uses a tying arrangement to evade maximum price regulation, the
victims are usually the seller's customers, all of which have similar
injuries that present a common question under rule 23(b)(3). When a
157. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) ("Standard Sta-
tions"). This case declared invalid an arrangement between Standard Oil and its independent
dealers. The arrangement required the dealers both to take their full requirements of gasoline
and to purchase all their "TBA" (tires, batteries, and accessories) from the oil company. Al-
though the quotation from Standard Oil appears often in judicial opinions, most courts today
return a judgment for the defendant in similar fact situations. See Hamro v. Shell Oil Co., 674
F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982); Pugh v. Mobil Oil Corp., 533 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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seller employs a tie-in to evade minimum price regulation, an injury
accrues to the defendant's competitors in the market for the tying
product. The fact of these injuries is a common question, provided
the competitors can show by common proof that they are in the same
market for the tying product as the defendant. Finally, whenever a
statutory monopolist uses tying arrangements to evade price regula-
tion, whether maximum or minimum, injuries can accrue to competi-
tors of the defendant in the market for the tied product; these inju-
ries are similar and thus are suitable for class action litigation.
Sellers occasionally use tying arrangements to conceal or facili-
tate predatory pricing. Because of the nature of predatory pricing,
however, class action lawsuits in this area are unlikely. The immedi-
ate victims of predatory pricing are the competitors of the predator.
Predation generally is plausible only when the number of competitors
is small enough that class action proceedings would not be necessary.
The long term victims of predatory pricing are consumers, which
might be sufficiently numerous to warrant class action proceedings.
This group, however, probably would not allege an illegal tying ar-
rangement; it would characterize the defendant's conduct as unlawful
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Tying arrangements often serve to facilitate price discrimination
or nondiscriminatory metering of the tying product's use. Although a
tie-in employed as a nondiscriminatory metering device creates effi-
ciency, most courts have not recognized efficiency as a defense in a
tie-in case. Whether the use of tie-ins to facilitate price discrimina-
tion ought to be illegal is a controversial issue among economists and
commentators. The judicial test for the illegality of tying arrange-
ments condemns many tie-ins used for price discrimination, and fed-
eral antitrust policy supports this approach. Price discrimination by
means of a tie-in is possible only when the seller has sufficient mar-
ket power. The price discrimination device sometimes enables this
seller to reach buyers that are willing to pay the marginal cost of the
tying product but unwilling to buy the item at its nondiscriminatory
profit-maximizing price. Similarly, the tie-in enables a seller to ex-
tract more than the profit-maximizing price from buyers that place a
high value on the tying product. Thus, a price discrimination tie-in
produces both beneficiaries and victims. The beneficiaries are the
customers that would not have purchased the defendant's product at
the nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price but now are able to
obtain the tying product at a lower price because of the tie-in. The
victims are the customers that could have bought the tying product
at its nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price without the tie-in,
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but that must pay more as a result of the tie-in.
A court can separate the beneficiaries from the victims only by
identifying what the defendant's profit-maximizing price would have
been in a nondiscriminatory market. That determination, however, is
difficult and complex and virtually forces the court to decide the
merits of a tie-in case. Price discrimination tie-ins, therefore, are not
suitable for class action proceedings under the current judicial inter-
pretations of rule 23. Rather, the doctrine of nonmutual, offensive
collateral estoppel may streamline litigation in these situations.
Many tying arrangements create efficiencies in production or dis-
tribution. Like most efficiency-creating arrangements, however, these
tie-ins produce both gainers and losers. The arrangement is efficient
if the gainers gain more than the losers lose. Although even effi-
ciency-creating tie-ins can be illegal under the prevailing judicial test
for illegality of tie-ins, courts increasingly are recognizing that effi-
cient arrangements should not be illegal. In any event, efficiency-cre-
ating tie-ins are not suitable for class action proceedings because
courts can distinguish the victims and beneficiaries of such tie-ins
only by analyzing each case individually. In these situations use of
nonmutual, offensive collateral estoppel for common issues would be
a more judicious approach.
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